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ABSTRACT
With a Free Flight policy, the emphasis for air traffic control is shifting from active control
to passive air traffic management with a policy of intervention by exception. Aircraft will be
allowed to fly user preferred routes, as long as safety Alert Zones are not violated. If there
is a potential conflict, two (or more) aircraft must be able to arrive at a solution for conflict
resolution without controller intervention. Thus, decision aid tools are needed in Free
Flight to detect and resolve conflicts, and several problems must be solved to develop such
tools. In this report, we analyze and solve problems of proximity management, conflict
detection, and conflict resolution under a Free Flight policy.
For proximity management, we establish a system based on Delaunay
Triangulations of aircraft at constant flight levels. Such a system provides a means for
analyzing the neighbor relationships between aircraft and the nearby free space around air
traffic which can be utilized later in conflict resolution.
For conflict detection, we perform both 2-dimensional and 3-dimensional analyses
based on the penetration of the Protected Airspace Zone. Both deterministic and non-
deterministic analyses are performed. We investigate several types of conflict warnings
including tactical warnings prior to penetrating the Protected Airspace Zone, methods based
on the reachability overlap of both aircraft, and conflict probability maps to establish
strategic Alert Zones around aircraft.
Conflict resolution maneuvers are investigated in the horizontal plane with heading
or speed control, and in the vertical plane with altitude control. Conflict resolution
maneuvers are studied for tactical close-range as well as strategic far-range cases. The
tactical analysis maximizes safety. The tactical conflict resolution strategy is the result of an
optimization problem: Determine the control as a function of the relative motion state such
that the range at closest approach is maximized. The solution is arrived at by applying
Euler-Lagrange equations for optimal control, and are best illustrated using maneuver
charts. These maneuver charts concisely illustrate the tactical conflict avoidance "rules-of-
the-road" indicating the turn directions, acceleration signs, or climb/descent rates that each
aircraft should select for any arbitrary initial relative state. The strategic analysis optimizes
economics while maintaining safety as the constraint. The strategic conflict resolution
strategy analyzes the geometry of heading, speed, and altitude maneuvers and estimates the
direct operating cost for these maneuvers. In general, altitude maneuvers are the most
economical, followed by heading maneuvers, and finally speed change maneuvers. For
non-cooperative heading maneuvers where only one aircraft maneuvers, it is generally
more economical to turn the aircraft to the backside of the non-cooperating aircraft. For
cooperative cases where both aircraft maneuver, it is generally better to let the faster aircraft
bear more of the burden. The cost and range required for speed control maneuvers make
this an ineffective means of conflict resolution.
Finally, the mechanization of a conflict detection and resolution system is analyzed.
System sources of error and uncertainties are identified, including measurement and
trajectory prediction uncertainties, actuation uncertainties, flight technical errors, and wind
uncertainty. Performance metrics are also identified for the purpose of evaluating the
safety, reliability, and efficiency of the system.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS
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11. INTRODUCTION
Aircraft conflict detection and resolution has a long history of investigation, but with
emerging Free Flight policies, new technologies, and an increased emphasis on economic
and market factors, conflict detection and resolution needs to be re-examined. New Free
Flight policies include the removal of many constraints, such as airways, the reduction in
required separations, and an emphasis on flight crews resolving conflicts without the
assistance of air traffic controllers. New communications (e.g., datalink), navigation (e.g.,
GPS), and surveillance (e.g., ADS, TCAS IV) technologies are becoming available. In the
future, technological advancements will continue to shape tactical close range conflict
avoidance, but strategic far range conflict avoidance will be reshaped by new procedures
and flight operations economics as well as new technology. Additionally, increasing traffic
levels challenge the air transportation system at all levels, including safety and capacity.
Considering all these factors, the underlying guiding principle for today's conflict detection
and resolution is improved flight economics, with the maintenance of today's level of
safety as a constraint.
1.1 Free Flight
The FAA is shifting from the current air traffic control (ATC) system to an air traffic
management (ATM) system with a policy referred to as Free Flight [A95, FF95,
RTCA94]. In en route airspace, the emphasis will be shifted from active to passive ATM
with an ATM policy of intervention by exception. Outside of congested airspace, an
aircraft will be allowed to fly autonomously as long as no other traffic crosses an Alert
Zone around the aircraft, as shown in Figure 1. If the Alert Zone is violated, either 1) an
air traffic controller will intervene to assist in conflict avoidance, or 2) the flight crews will
resolve the conflict autonomously while being monitored by the ATM system. The size and
Figure 1. Free Flight zones around aircraft.
2shapeof theAlert Zonehasyet to be determined. To ensuresafety, no aircraftshould
penetrateanotheraircraft's ProtectedAirspaceZone. In Free Flight, expectedaircraft
trajectorieswill be optimal cost flights with adjustmentsto maintainreasonabletime of
arrivalsconsistentwith operatingschedules.Theseflightscanbe fuelefficientcruise-climb
bestwind routetrajectories,rather than following the airways asconstrainedby current
ATM/ATC.
FreeFlight will enablegreatertraffic volumeandcomplexityby distributingsome
of the functionality, including conflict detectionand resolution, to airborne systems
(includingpilots). If thereis a potentialconflict, two (or more)aircraftmust be able to
arriveata solutionfor conflict resolutionwith mutualgain(or mutualminimumloss) and
withouttheneedto contactanenroutecontroller.Thus,decisionaidingtoolsareneededin
FreeFlight to detectandresolveconflicts.
1.2 A Review of Conflict Detection and Resolution Literature
Early collision avoidance investigators such as [Mo58, HM70, SM73] examined
maneuvers analytically and developed conflict detection criteria. Most work involved
encounters where only one aircraft maneuvers. A noteworthy early contribution was
Morrel's [Mo58] predicted time-to-collision criteria, _, computed as range divided by range
rate. Much of the past work dealt with the problem of incomplete tracking data which is
rapidly becoming a non-issue. Nonetheless, this work should not be dismissed. Complex
issues such as maneuver selection, false alarms resulting from measurement error, the
definition of hazard regions, and the definition of "rules-of-the-road" were all addressed.
Today, traffic is strategically ordered to avoid conflicts. Such ordering is achieved
via approach and departure routes, jet routes, the hemispherical altitude rule, step climbs,
and so on. In Free Flight, much of this routing structure will become obsolete, but the
need for conflict avoidance at the tactical and strategic levels will not; it will simply take on
a new form.
Conflicts are currently automatically detected by ATC using a Conflict Alert on the
Plan View Display (PVD) and with an Oceanic Display and Planning System (ODAPS)
Conflict Probe. For the Conflict Alert [No94], lateral and vertical separation filters identify
conflict conditions which alert the air traffic controller by blinking the conflicting pair of
aircraft symbols and sounding an audible alert. ODAPS has a conflict probe that assists
oceanic controllers by providing advance notification of conflicts detected from flight plan
information [No94, FAA93]. The conflict probe first identifies candidate pairwise aircraft
conflictsusingacoarsefilter for proximity andtimeoverlap.A fine filter is thenappliedfor
detailedcalculationswith respecto agivenpairof aircraft. The fine filter outputs"conflict
in" and "conflict out" datathatidentify thetime andlocationwheretheconflict startsand
ends, and the type of conflict, including trespassingover reservedairspace,head-on
conflict, intersectionconflict, overtakingconflict, or a bad data warning. No conflict
resolutionadvisoriesarecomputedby eitherof theseautomationprocesses;rather,it is the
roleof theair traffic controllerto solvetheconflict resolutionproblem.
TheConflict ResolutionAdvisory(CRA) wasdesignedto provide radarcontrollers
with conflict resolution alternativesin a textual messageformat [HGT83, CBB92].
Resolutions were limited to vectoring left or fight at a specified angle, or
descending/climbing/holdingfor a specifiedaltitudechange. For complexscenarios,the
CRA would not give an advisory. When evaluatedby controllers [CBB92], most
controllersusedtheCRA asasecond-handverificationthattheyweremakinggoodconflict
resolutions.Becausethe CRA could not be trusted for a solution for all cases,some
controllerschosenot to usetheCRA. This experiencedemonstratestheneedfor complete
solutionsfor conflict resolution,andoneswith air traffic controlleracceptance.
Close-proximitymidair conflicts are currently detectedby the Traffic alert and
CollisionAvoidanceSystem(TCAS),anairbornebasedtransponder/receiversystem[F86,
Ha89,WiS89,BAW94]. TCAS I simply alertsthepilot of anintruderaircraft. TCAS II is
thecurrentcommercialtransportversionfor TCAS; it providesresolutionadvisoriesfor
verticalavoidancemaneuversonly. However, the fundamentalx criterion defining the
protected airspace zone for the current TCAS II is shown in Chapter 2 to be insufficient for
the expected separation requirements for Free Flight. TCAS III incorporates horizontal
maneuvers by exploiting bearing rate measurements, however, TCAS III was canceled by
the FAA due to poor antenna performance results. Finally, TCAS IV, which is still being
developed, exploits the precision of GPS and aircraft state information exchange via
datalink. TCAS IV allows for the use of horizontal and vertical maneuvers. TCAS IV
proceeds in the direction of Free Flight, and in the terms of this report, addresses the topic
of tactical collision avoidance.
It is important to look at the current and future NASA and FAA research efforts in
order to understand how any future Free Flight system might integrate into the National
Airspace System (NAS). The trend with NASA and the FAA is to increase the degree of
automation in ATM/ATC and to decrease the constraints imposed. As a step towards Free
Flight, the FAA has established the National Route Program (NRP) [A95]. This program
4currentlyinvolvesover 100 city pairs, and includesa gradualadaptationof FreeFlight
conceptsphasedin at or aboveflight level FL390 and graduallyincluding lower flight
levels.
A Free Flight systemmayconnectwith future ATM by someextensionof the
AutomatedEn Route ATC system (AERA) and Center-TRACONAutomationSystem
(CTAS). Higher capacitiesenabledby a FreeFlight systemmay increasethe densityof
traffic convergingto arrival airports, and this will requiresuch automateden routeand
TRACON systems[RTCA94].
The AERA project,developedby theMITRE Corporation,hasprogressedin stages
[Ni89]. First, AERA 1 investigatedconflict detectionbasedon flight plans for pairs of
aircraftwith ultimateseparationof aircraftremainingwith thecontroller. Next, AERA 2
suggestedresolution maneuversgeneratedthrough automation,but held the controller
responsiblefor separationdecisions. Finally, AERA 3 investigatedfully automated
algorithmic conflict detectionand resolution.Multiple aircraftconflicts are handledby
consideringpairwiseconflict resolutions. Thecontrollerperformsplanningfunctionsbut
only participatesin separationdecisionsin anomaloussituations. While AERA was
designedfor today'sATC system,it mayalsoprovidesomeusefulalgorithmicbackground
for FreeFlight. As a resultof theAERA project, the MITRE Corporationis currently
developingthe User RequestEvaluationTool (URET). URET is designedto be a
monitoringtool that allowsair traffic controllersto investigatepotentialconflicts thatmay
occurwith pilot requestsfor flight planchanges[SW95]. While this technologyprovides
the air traffic controllera tool to investigateconflicts, it does not assist in suggesting
conflict resolutionstrategies.
CTAS is anautomationsystemfor the managementand control of arrival traffic
developedby NASA andtheFAA [DEG91,Er92,Er95]. CTAS is composedof aTraffic
ManagementAdvisor (TMA) thatmaintainssequencingandscheduling,a DescentAdvisor
(DA) thatprovidescruisespeedanddescentclearances,andaFinalApproachSpacingTool
(FAST)that assiststheTRACONcontrollersin spacingarrivalaircrafton final approach.
Extensiveevaluationsof CTAShavedemonstratedcontrolleracceptance,delayreductions,
andfuel savings[BE96].
Otherinnovativeapproachesto conflict detectionandresolutionincludeknowledge-
basedsystemapproaches[Da92,Cr83], self-organizingpotentialfield approaches[Eb94],
and agent-basednegotiationor principled negotiation[Ste94, WAS94, WAS96]. For
further review of today'saircraft/airspacesystemand ATM/ATC, see [AIM95, No94,
PM89,WAS95].
1.3 Contributions and Report Organization
The objective of this research effort is to examine the topic of conflict detection and
resolution for Free Flight. Our contributions to this field include the following:
Conflict detection schemes for 2-dimensional and 3-dimensional analysis,
including deterministic and non-deterministic analysis,
Optimal maneuver charts for heading, speed, and altitude maneuvers that
maximize safety for tactical short range encounters,
Short range tactical and far range strategic Alert Zone definitions to inform
ATC or pilots of conflicts,
Minimum cost heading, speed, and altitude control maneuvers for far range
strategic encounters,
Efficient proximity management of aircraft based on Delaunay
Triangulations, and
Examination of the implementation issues for a Free Flight conflict detection
and resolution system.
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Chapter 2 outlines the system
analysis approach, including a tactical/strategic decomposition scheme, cooperative and
non-cooperative scenarios, and cases for heading, speed, and altitude modes of control
maneuvers. Chapter 3 presents the derivation of the equations for conflict detection
criteria, both in two and three dimensions. Chapter 4 presents tactical conflict resolution
strategies, and Chapter 5 presents strategic conflict resolution strategies. The treatment of
measurement and trajectory actuation errors and implementation issues are discussed in
Chapter 6; and conclusions and recommendations are stated in Chapter 7. References cited
throughout this report are listed at the end.

2. SYSTEM ANALYSIS
In this chapter, an analysis of a conflict detection and resolution system is presented. This
work includes the description of a candidate system architecture, a tactical/strategic problem
decomposition, considerations of cooperative and non-cooperative cases, and a breakdown
of different modes of control. Finally, the equations of relative motion for a two aircraft
system are presented.
2.1 System Architecture
A candidate system architecture is proposed that is appropriate for Free Flight and recent
technologies. This candidate system architecture is shown in Figure 2, and is composed of
a proximity management system, a conflict detection system, a conflict resolution system,
and a display management system. The proximity management system maintains aircraft
identification and state information for a given sector of airspace. The conflict detection
system identifies conflicts based on proximity data and computational analysis. The conflict
resolution system uses both the proximity management system and conflict detection
system to initialize conflict resolution, and analyzes the situation for a computed solution.
The display management system communicates traffic information, conflicts, and conflict
resolution advisories to the pilot and/or air traffic controller.
Aircraft Traffic [Proximity Management
I I
Conflict Detection L_ Conflict Resolution
I I
Traffic,
Conflict Detection,
and Resolution
Display
Figure 2. A top level description for a candidate conflict detection and resolution system.
The system architecture is not constrained to either an all-airborne system, mixed-
airborne and ground-based system, or a ground-based system. We do not include any of
these application specific considerations in our theoretical analysis until Chapter 6, which
discusses implementation issues. However, in general, if the system is an all-airborne
system, proximity management information will most likely be passed from aircraft to
aircraft in an Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) type datalink system.
With no ground-based component to compensate for unequipped aircraft, all aircraft would
be required to possess datalink and Global Positioning System (GPS) capabilities to form
the basis for aircraft proximity information. Conflict detection and resolution algorithms
would be retained in flight management system (FMS) computers, and the display would
be a pilot cockpit display.
If the system is a mixed or ground-based system, any or all of these components
can be located on the ground. Ground-based radar could compensate for unequipped
aircraft without data/ink and GPS capabilities. Furthermore, ground-based systems could
provide a proximity management system that links all aircraft to ATC as well as to Airline
Operations Centers (AOCs).
Conflict detection and resolution analysis can be performed either on the ground or
in the air, and communicated to the appropriate aircraft through today's radio
communications techniques or datalink communications. In a mixed system, displays
would exist for the pilot as well as for ground-based ATC/ATM/AOC.
2.2 A Tactical/Strategic Decomposition
In our research, conflict scenarios are divided into two categories: near-range conflicts
which cannot be avoided without immediate action and long-range conflicts which can be
smoothly resolved so that they never become near-range threats. We refer to these as
tactical and strategic encounters, respectively; we refer to the maneuvers that resolve them
as conflict resolution maneuvers. In our technical approach, we first investigate how
tactical encounters should be resolved, and then consider strategic encounters. There is
considerable overlap between these two areas, but there are also important differences.
One difference between the tactical and strategic cases is that additional conflicts
with neighboring traffic are more likely in strategic maneuvers. This is because strategic
maneuvers take more time and airspace to perform. While the two-aircraft scenario can be
used to approximate strategic maneuvers, they cannot be fully analyzed without looking at
expected traffic patterns. This requires that strategic maneuvers be tested in a simulation to
determine their true cost, and that traffic congestion problems for strategic maneuvers be
sufficiently addressed. Our technical approach calls for both analysis and simulation.
Another significant difference between the tactical and strategic cases is that
measurement and trajectory uncertainties become more important in the strategic case. For
tactical cases, both aircraft are more likely to be experiencing the same wind conditions,
9andthetimerequiredto resolveconflictsissmall,thusallowingtrajectoryuncertaintiesless
time to build up. In comparison,the strategicscenariooccursat far rangewhen both
aircraft may be experiencingdifferent wind conditions and the time for trajectory
uncertaintiesto propagateismuchlarger.
2.3 Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Cases
The intruder aircraft may cooperatively maneuver to assist in increasing the miss distance,
may be non-cooperative and execute no maneuver, or may blunder and execute a maneuver
that reduces the miss distance. We investigate both cooperative maneuver and non-
cooperative cases, and assume that the Alert Zone size and shape will provide a sufficient
safety factor to account for the blundering intruder aircraft. For the non-cooperative case,
we assume that the intruder has a constant-velocity vector. For the initial analysis, we
assume that wind conditions are the same for both aircraft. This assumption is more
appropriate for tactical situations; thus, wind variations are only considered for the analysis
of missed and false alarms for strategic situations.
2.4 Horizontal, Vertical, Speed, and Combined Control
Three fundamental controls for maneuvers can be used (alone or in combination) to avoid a
conflict: turn (horizontal maneuvers), accelerate/decelerate (speed control maneuvers), and
climb/descend (vertical maneuvers). In general, turns result in the greatest miss distance in
the long term. For example, an aircraft maneuvering laterally with an acceleration of 0.5g
can achieve a turn displacement of approximately 3200 feet in 20 seconds. An aircraft
with a maximum climb rate of 2400 feet per minute (typical of commercial jet transports)
can attain a vertical displacement of only 800 feet in the same time period.
Vertical maneuvers do provide more separation than a turn, however, for a very
short time period after the maneuver is initiated. More importantly, because vertical
separation minimums are significantly less (currently by a factor of 15 for en route flight)
than horizontal minimums, vertical maneuvers fare better when the basis of comparison is
not absolute separation, but separation relative to the appropriate Protected Airspace Zone
minimum. This vertical maneuver advantage will likely be reduced because horizontal
minimums have more potential reduction than the vertical minimums - aircraft horizontal
locations will be known more precisely in the future.
Of course, separation resulting from both turns and vertical maneuvers depend on
the maneuver rates (lateral acceleration and altitude rate, respectively). But in general, a
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verticalmaneuverprovidesgreaterseparationinitially, andthen the turn catchesup and
providesgreaterseparationin the long term. Speedcontrol providesthe leastseparation
overa giventime spanof thethreemaneuvertypes. A summaryof thetypesof controls
andgenericinitiationtimesisgivenin Figure3. Thisreportincludesacompleteanalysisof
conflict resolutionstrategiesby consideringall threecontroloptions.
Intruder _/'_[---_-_,1 b.
Aircraft i_<---__lative _,,
'- .--7_---_-__-_- "elocit_, ,-,. _
0_----._. ._/t l -----._._ ..Y k.JWH
Protected,_,- ............ Ran____ Aircraft
Airspace Lone
Maneuver Option
• Strategic Maneuver Range
• Tactical Maneuver Range
Controls
• Speed Control Initiated
• Turn Initiated
• Altitude Change Initiated
• Combined Maneuvers Initiated
Generic Time Line r
I I
I I
I I
I I
Figure 3. Comparison of effective initiation times for several modes of control.
2.5 Equations of Relative Motion
Relative to the own aircraft A, the equations of motion of the intruder aircraft B can be
expressed in polar coordinates as [SM73]:
Range Equation:
Bearing Equation:
Relative Heading Equation:
Relative Altitude Equation:
/" = --V A COS 1_ "l" V B COS(0 -- _) ( 1 )
= -COA + l[vA sin _ + v Bsin(0 - q_)] (2)
r
= COB- COA (3)
= 6vB - 6VA (4)
I1
where,asshownin Figure4, r is the range, va and v_ are the speeds of aircraft A and B
relative to an inertially fixed reference, 0 is the heading of aircraft B relative to the heading
of aircraft A, 0 is the angle-off from aircraft A to aircraft B, COAand co B are the turn rates
of aircraft A and B, and fiv A and &B are the vertical speeds of aircraft A and B.
Additionally, x, y, and z locate the intruder aircraft B relative to the moving reference frame
fixed in the own aircraft A, as shown in Figure 4. Throughout this report, the speed ratio
parameter, defined as:
_ VB/V A
is commonly used as a basis of comparing results.
(5)
[nertial
Reference
Frame
A _rarn e
Figure 4. Relative geometry of two aircraft in a horizontal plane.
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3. CONFLICT DETECTION
In this chapter,we discussaircraft separationrequirements,severalcandidateconflict
detectioncriteria,andamethodfor aircraftproximitymanagement.
3.1 Separation Requirements
Today's separation standards are in part because of the accuracy of today's radar systems
and displays. For domestic en route flight, current separation standards call for 5 nmi
horizontal and 2000 ft vertical separation (1000 ft at or below FL290), as illustrated in
Figure 5. Approach control standards are 3 nmi horizontal and 1000 ft vertical separation.
Vertical separation standards today are influenced by the inherent errors in baro-altimeters.
Domestic en route horizontal separations are set at 5 nmi because of worst case
uncertainties of radar trackers where error grows with range from the tracker; this is
reduced to 3 nmi inside the TRACON where range from the tracker is usually less than
50 nmi. In Free Flight, aircraft will be equipped with GPS navigation augmented by INS
and WAAS or LAAS differential corrections. This will allow aircraft to operate at Required
Navigation Performance (RNP) 5-0"horizontal and vertical error limits of well below 1 nmi
and 200 ft. This will also allow the implementation of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B) where aircraft regularly report their position, velocity, and intent to
other aircraft and to the ATM system. Thus, both navigation and surveillance errors that are
Figure 5.
5 nmiles
_m
F L290
The current separation standards viewed as a Protected Airspace Zone for
Free Flight (taken from [ADK96] with permission from the authors).
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typical of today'sflights will begreatlyreducedleadingto smallerseparationconstraints.
Today'sseparationstandardsarealsoestablishedbasedon acceptablelevelsfor the
probability of unobservedcloseapproach- a safetymeasure. As shown in Figure 6,
today's SecondarySurveillanceRadar(SSR) requiresa 5 nmi horizontal separationto
ensurea safeprobabilityof no conflict betweenen routeaircraftwith crossingpaths; the
correspondingGPS-basedsystemwould requireonly 0.5nmi separationfor thesamelevel
of safety [Ga96]. The SSR usedfor today's terminalarearequiresa 3 nmi horizontal
separationstandard;the correspondingGPS-basedsystemwould require only 1 nmi
separationfor the samelevelof safety[Ga96]. With thesereducedlevels, the limiting
factoris expectedto bebasedon waketurbulenceeffectsandflight technicalerrors more
thanonsurveillancepositionuncertaintyconsiderations.As GPS-basedaircraftproliferate,
separationstandardswill mostlikely bereducedin steps,perhapsfrom 5 nmi to 3 nmi to
1nmi andthento 0.5nmi. In [Ga96],it is shownthatreducedseparationstandardscanbe
implementedholdingthecurrentlevelof safetyconstantas long asthepercentageof GPS-
basedaircraft increasesaccordingly. Finally, separationstandardsmight also differ for
aircraftthatareradar-trackedversusaircraftthatreportGPS-basedproximity information.
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Figure 6. The probability of lateral overlap (unobserved close approach) as a function of
horizontal separation standard; dotted lines represent today's separation
standards for 5 nmi en route and 3 nmi terminal area (taken from [G96] with
permission from the author).
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3.2 Conflict Detection Criteria for Tactical Scenarios
Separation standards establish the size and shape of the Protected Airspace Zone and a
conflict criterion for Free Flight. As shown in Figures 5 and 7, a constant horizontal and
vertical separation standard establishes a cylindrical Protected Airspace Zone volume. To
ensure safety, no aircraft should penetrate another aircraft's Protected Airspace Zone.
Consider the situation when two aircraft traveling with constant speeds are oblivious of
each other, and will engage in a crossing encounter. Figure 7 shows how the relative
motion of the two aircraft can be analyzed by investigating the dynamics of the intruder
aircraft B with respect to the own aircraft A. A conflict exists if an aircraft flies into the
Protected Airspace Zone. A conflict detection mechanism should include an alert zone to
warn of an impending conflict. The time-to-go for penetrating the Protected Airspace Zone
volume, the time to closest approach, or other criteria may help define such an alert zone.
Several candidate tactical conflict detection alert zones are next considered for Free Flight.
 ,ote te 
Ai,space
Zone
Figure 7. Conflict detection for Free Flight.
The first conflict detection criterion considered is based on a time-to-go alert zone
around the Protected Airspace Zone. For comparison with other conflict detection criteria,
Figure 8 illustrates the Protected Airspace Zone in the horizontal plane, and an alert zone.
The alert zone identifies the location of the intruder 30 seconds or less from penetrating the
Protected Airspace Zone of the own aircraft A. The alert zone is illustrated in a relative
frame of reference with respect to the own aircraft A. By definition, this alert zone
boundary resides outside the Protected Airspace Zone and is based on constant relative
motion between the two aircraft. Thus, it makes a good candidate for a tactical conflict
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detectionmechanismfor FreeFlight, but has limitationsfor maneuveringor blundering
aircraft- aircraftwhichhappento maneuverin a way thatexacerbatestheconflict. In the
nextsectionof thisreport,a two-dimensionalanalysisin thehorizontalplaneand a general
three-dimensionalanalysisareperformedfor thisconflict detectioncriterion.
Another alert zone can be basedon the maneuvertime required for conflict
resolution. The timeto theProtectedAirspaceZonedoesnot necessarilyindicateif both
aircraftcanmaneuverwithin theremainingtimeto avoida conflict. In Chapter4, we will
determinea TacticalAlert Zonethatindicatesthelastopportunityto startmaneuveringto
avoida conflict. Sincethis is the last chanceto maneuver,a conflict warningcould be
given T seconds prior to this last chance to maneuver. Figure 9 illustrates a 30 seconds or
less alert zone warning before the last chance to maneuver. In general, this alert zone will
be outside the 30 second warning for the Protected Airspace Zone. This conflict criterion
makes a good candidate for a tactical conflict detection mechanism for Free Flight,
assuming that both aircraft will cooperate in conflict resolution (neither aircraft will
blunder).
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Figure 8. A horizontal Protected Airspace Zone conflict warning region for Free Flight.
A 0 = 60 ° heading difference (left) and a 0 = 120 ° (right) heading difference is
shown in a moving reference frame including the Protected Airspace Zone and
zero range rate line (indicated by +/-).
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Figure 9. A horizontal Tactical Alert Zone conflict warning for Free Flight. The outer
boundary identifies 30 seconds prior to the last chance to successfully maneuver
around the Protected Airspace Zone - shown by the inner boundary. A 0 = 60°
heading difference (left) and a 0 = 120 ° (right) heading difference is shown in a
moving reference frame including the Protected Airspace Zone and zero range rate
line (indicated by +/-).
For comparison, the TCAS II threat boundary is also examined. While the precise
criterion for a conflict in TCAS II is multi-faceted (see [F86] for details), the basic
"x criterion", for which TCAS II logic is derived, can be readily depicted in the horizontal
relative motion plane. Figure 10 illustrates the threat boundary for the "_criterion based on
a x = 30 second warning. The "ccriterion, computed as range divided by range rate, does
not incorporate bearing measurements nor does it incorporate the horizontal separation
requirement. Notice that, depending on the relative motion, the TCAS II threat boundary
may or may not reside outside the Protected Airspace Zone. Thus, it does not make a good
criterion for tactical conflict detection for Free Flight.
Another alternative conflict detection criterion can be based on the time-to-go to the
Point of Closest Approach (PCA). Figure 11 illustrates the alert zone boundary for a
30 seconds or less time-to-go to PCA criterion. Once again, notice that depending on the
relative motion, the threat boundary may or may not reside outside the Protected Airspace
Zone. This time-to-go criterion, like the x criterion, is a poor candidate for Free Flight
because it does not directly incorporate the horizontal separation requirement.
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Figure 10. Horizontal conflict warning region for the 'rcriterion in TCAS II. A 0 = 60°
heading difference (left) and a 0 = 120 ° (right) heading difference is shown
in a moving reference frame including the Protected Airspace Zone and zero
range rate line (indicated by +/-).
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Figure I I. Horizontal conflict detection based on time-to-go to the point of closest
approach. A 0 = 60 ° heading difference (left) and a 0 = 120° (right) heading
difference is shown in a moving reference frame including the Protected
Airspace Zone and zero range rate line (indicated by +/-).
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A reachability criterion can also be used for tactical conflict detection. Several
variations are possible. The first reachability criterion is based on checking the overlap
between the locus of all possible points that each aircraft can be in the next T seconds, as
shown in Figure 12. As shown later, this criterion is very conservative and has a high
false alarm rate. Second, a teachability criterion which includes the Protected Airspace
Zone (PAZ) is also a candidate conflict criterion. Consider the definition suggested by the
RTCA Committee on Free Flight [RTCA94]:
"For a given look ahead time T, the Alert Zone is the locus of all possible
Protected [Airspace] Zones of the aircraft at time T."
If another aircraft crosses into this alert zone boundary, then a conflict occurs. This
definition considers only the teachability of a single aircraft, and the intent of the aircraft is
not considered. This definition may be slightly modified to account for intermediate
locations of the aircraft by including the locus of all possible PAZ regions from any given
time up to and including time T into the future. Figure 13 illustrates both this RTCA
definition and this intermediate location definition. These two teachability definitions can
be considered worst-case criteria, and may be applicable in situations where the intruder
aircraft is non-cooperative, blundering, or is already engaged in a maneuver. Later, in
Chapter 4, it is shown that such teachability conflict alert zone criteria could be useful in
solving multiple aircraft conflict scenarios.
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Figure 12. Horizontal conflict detection based on aircraft reachability. A 0 = 60 °
heading difference (left) and a 0 = 120 ° (right) heading difference is shown
in an inertial reference frame identifying the locus of possible locations for
each aircraft.
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Figure 13. Horizontal conflict detection based on teachability of the Protected Airspace
Zone. The locus of all Protected Airspace Zone volumes at time 7"=30
seconds (left) and the locus of all Protected Airspace Zone volumes from
time T=0 seconds up to and including time T=30 seconds (right) are
compared.
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3.3 Conflict Detection Criteria for Strategic Scenarios
For strategic scenarios, the concept of a conflict detection should take into account
separation standards as well as trajectory uncertainties due to wind variations, measurement
errors, and actuation variations (flight technical errors). As shown in the example in
Figure 15, if no errors were to occur, the relative motion of an aircraft far away in a
strategic scenario can be classified as a conflict situation for a long narrow conflict region,
the region thickness being equal to the diameter of the Protected Airspace Zone. However,
when uncertainties are introduced in the initial relative position, velocity, and heading, the
same relative aircraft geometry indicate a small 0.25 probability of a conflict. At a far
range, there is a greater probability that the aircraft miss the Protected Airspace Zone than
penetrate it. The development of such a non-deterministic analysis is presented later in
Section 3.5.
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Figure 15. The deterministic strategic conflict region (left) for very large prediction
times to closest approach and a non-deterministic strategic conflict region
(right) based on the probability of a conflict given likely uncertainties in
position (O'p = 100 m), speed (orv = 10 m/sec), and heading (or V = 10°).
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100
For strategic conflict detection, the avionics (or ATM ground system automation)
must project the aircraft trajectories ahead in time out to, say, 20 minutes, where both
aircraft may be experiencing vastly different wing conditions. At jet aircraft speeds, a
20 minute prediction could involve aircraft that are initially 400 nmi apart. The wind
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variationover this rangecanbesignificant,especiallyin frontal conditionsor nearthe jet
stream.A 6 kt headwind error relativeto theforecastinusefor oneaircraftcouldproduce
a 12seconderror in thetime to thepoint of closestapproachor arangeerrorof 2 nmi.
Thesecondtypeof trajectorypredictionerrorconsideredis dueto navigationerror.
Even thoughaugmentedGPS will probablybe used, therewill still be error within the
RNPequipmentthatis on eachaircraftin theconflict. In particular,themeasuredvelocity
errorhasasignificanteffecton theprojectedcrossingof two aircrafttrajectories.
Thethird typeof trajectoryerror is duethefact thatthepilot (or autopilot)will not
steerthe aircraftperfectlyalongtheintendedflight plan; thevariationbetweenthe stateat
which the navigationsystemdepictswherethe aircraft should be relativeto the actual
measuredstateis commonlyreferredto asflight technicalerrorFTE. Lateraland vertical
variationsin positioncausetheaircraftto takelongerto reachacertainpoint. Variationsin
airspeed,alongwith headwind variationsfrom thewind forecastbeingused,affectarrival
timeat anyfuturepoint.Thus,thestrategiclogicmustbe robustto errorsin thewind field
data,navigationstatemeasurement,andFTE effects in terms of the dynamicsused to
projectthetrajectoryoutcomes.
3.4 Two-Dimensional Horizontal Deterministic Conflict Analysis
For the two-dimensional analysis, assume the motion of the two aircraft remains in a
horizontal plane at a fixed altitude and that each aircraft flies without sideslip. The
geometry is illustrated in Figure 16, where r is the range, vA is the speed of the own
aircraft A, v B is the speed of the intruder aircraft B, 0 is the heading difference between
__ _,,_/Zero Range
B Rate Line
/ Relative
_" _-- Motion Line
Pure_ r_p
?
Collision _ CA (Point of Closest Approach)
Lin __. rf
Moving Reference
Frame
(_ shown negative)
Figure 16. Relative motion of two oblivious aircraft in a horizontal plane.
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aircraft B and aircraft A, and ¢ is the angle-off from aircraft A's velocity vector to
aircraft B. The heading of each aircraft is in the direction of the velocity vector, since the
sideslip angle is assumed to be zero. The variables x and v locate the aircraft B relative to
the moving reference flame fixed in aircraft A.
Depending on geometry, the situation may represent a pure collision, a near miss,
or no conflict. Two critical factors to analyze are the zero range rate line where / = 0 and
the range at closest approach. When the range rate is negative, future positions may lead
the intruder aircraft closer to a conflict. In the moving reference frame, the zero range rate
line is at a bearing angle /31 defined by the relation:
= v_ sin 0
c°sflr x/va 2 + v s" - 2vav 8 cosO
(6)
where, as shown in Figure 16, vA is the speed of the own aircraft A, vB is the speed of the
intruder aircraft B, and 0 is the heading difference between aircraft B and aircraft A. The
relative motion of aircraft B will follow a trajectory perpendicular to the zero range rate line.
A pure collision results if this trajectory is perpendicular to the zero range rate line at the
origin, as shown in Figure 16. A conflict occurs if the miss distance rs, occurring at the
Point of Closest Approach (PCA), is less than the Protected Airspace Zone radius; the
miss distance can be calculated from the equation:
ri = rcos(/3s - _0) (7)
where r is the initial range, q_ is the angle off, and fls is the bearing angle. A definition for
the miss distance as a vector _s is:
= x x (8)
where and ? is the vector locating aircraft B with respect to aircraft A, and _ is the unit
vector in the direction of the relative motion vector ? :
g
=-- where _'=vs-va. (9)
I1 11
The time-to-closest-approach r is analyzed next. From analytic geometry:
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rsin(fl_. - _)
r = , _ . (lO)
ffv A" + %- - 2VAVt_ COS0
In vector notation, the time-to-closest-approach is equivalently defined:
77- (11)
H
The time-to-closest-approach is different from the classical definition of Morrel's [Mo58]
predicted time-to-collision criteria, computed as simply range divided by range rate. To use
a time-to-closest-approach criterion for conflict detection, accurate bearing measurements
must exist and are available today with GPS and datalink technologies. In previous
systems, accurate and timely bearing measurements were not available, leaving range and
range rate for computing a time to a potential collision. Note that in comparison, the time-
to-closest-approach becomes zero as the intruder aircraft crosses the zero range rate line,
but the time-to-collision criteria approaches a singularity.
The relative motion of two aircraft may be analyzed by looking at relative motion
charts for various heading differences, as shown in Figure 17. Relative motion charts
become the basis for creating maneuver charts for conflict resolution, as developed later in
Chapters 4 and 5. In Figure 17, neither aircraft performs a control action for conflict
resolution; the notation A 0 B o denotes that no control (0 turn rate and no speed change) is
being performed by aircraft A and aircraft B.
The orientation of the zero range rate line can be examined for various heading
differences as shown in Figure 18. Most aircraft speeds will be within the range: 100 < v
< 550 kts, so throughout this report computations and examples are performed with the
1
speed ratio in the range: g < )' < 6, with speed ratios near 1 being most typical. Finally,
note that there is a singularity in the equation for the zero range rate line at zero heading
= +n" unless _ = 1 where there is no solutiondifference 0 = 0, where the bearing is /31 - 2 '
(both aircraft are flying parallel to one another with the same velocity).
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Figure 17. Relative Motion Charts for oblivious aircraft (speed ratio 7 = 1).
26
Behavior of Zero Range Rate Line
150
1 O0
I
._ 50
_..1
n-- 0
t_
¢'1-
2 -50
N
O
._-1 O0
-150
_<1
-150 -100
= [0.2, 0.4 ..... 1.8]
_<1
z _
-50 0 50 100 150
Heading Difference: theta (deg.)
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3.5 Two-Dimensional Horizontal Non-Deterministic Conflict Analysis
As mentioned previously for the application of strategic scenarios, the concept of a conflict
detection may also be modeled with a non-deterministic analysis. The implicit assumption
is that a non-deterministic approach may be better than a deterministic approach when
considering false alarm rates and missed detections. When the intruder aircraft is far away,
the non-deterministic approach will identify that an actual conflict has a low probability,
thus reducing the false alarm rate. When uncertainties are introduced in the initial relative
position, velocity, and heading, the probability of a conflict can be considered in
comparison to the precise geometric definition of a conflict from the deterministic approach.
The non-deterministic analysis assumes that the relative state information is known
stochastically. The location, speed, and heading of aircraft are assumed to be normally
distributed around measured or reported values, and these values are assumed to be held
constant during the entire time of the encounter. The error sources are assumed to be
independent, and the error characteristics of the two aircraft are assumed to be identical, to
simplify the analysis.
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As discussedwith the deterministicapproach,a conflict is defined for the two
dimensionalhorizontalplanewhenthehorizontalseparationstandardis violated. In a non-
deterministicanalysis, the probability of a conflict is determinedby evaluating the
probabilityP that the miss distance rt, occurring at the Point of Closest Approach (PCA),
is less than or equal to the Protected Airspace Zone radius R:
P(conflict) = P( r_,_R) (12)
This probability can be computed for a range of initial conditions of aircraft B relative to
aircraft A to form a conflict probability map.
One method for constructing a conflict probability map is to use Monte Carlo
simulations. A grid is formed by discritizing the relative location (x,y) of the intruder
aircraft B relative to aircraft A. Normal (Gaussian) distributions are used to model the
position, velocity, and heading variables. A simulation propagates the motion of each
vehicle to the point of closest approach and statistics can be enumerated for the probability
of a conflict. An example is given in Figure 19, where the aircraft measurement
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Figure 19. The conflict probability map derived from Monte Carlo simulations.
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uncertaintiesfor both aircraftare: the standarddeviationon position O'p = 100 m, the
standard deviation on speed 0% = 10 m/sec, and the standard deviation on heading
cry= 5 °. This technique is used by Kuchar, et al, in conflict avoidance applications
[Ku96, YAK97].
Alternatively, instead of using Monte Carlo simulations, analytic expressions can be
used to establish probability maps. If one were to assume that the motion of each vehicle
proceeds with a constant velocity, equatior '7) or (8) can be applied to determine the point
of closest approach, eliminating the he: to propagate simulations. By mathematically
analyzing a miss distance equation, the mean and error variance for the miss distance can
be established. First, the miss distance is represented by taking the vector norm of
equation (8):
r,.= lie× x  )ll= r_,,- r,_3 (13)
where x and y subscripts represent the x-component and y-component of the relative
position vector _ and relative motion unit vector g-. Furthermore, these vector components
can be represented:
= _. - q, (14)
V --
_ = x. v_. , and (16)
_(v -v_,) 2 +(v,. - v,,) 2
c,. = v_, - v_'A , (17)
)2 _ )2@vx.-v_A +(%. v,,A
where subscripts A and B correspond to aircraft A and aircraft B. By substituting equations
(14) through (17) into equation (13) the miss distance can be expressed in the form:
(% - r_A)(% - v_. ) - (% - r;. )(% - v_. )
)2 + . _ . )2
Next, the form of equation (18) is a non-linear functionfof eight random variables:
(18)
re. = f (r_,,r_.,_, ,r,, ,v_.,v_.,v,, ,v:,). (19)
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A generalfunctionof n random variables:
z = f(x.,x z ..... x,) (20)
can be approximated to the first order by expanding a Taylor's Series about the mean
values of the random variables:
,'= ..... (21)
where H.O.T. stands for Higher Order Terms. Equation (21) can be approximated with
the first order approximation:
"oy_ °oy
-;'_=l aX i -_=i o"x,
where the first two terms are composed of deterministic variables, and the last (summation)
term is composed of random variables. Next, for a set of mutually independent random
variables xi:
/1 ,'1
Var(z_,aixi)= z_,a2, Var(x_). (23)
i=1 i=1
Applying equation (23) to the general expression of the miss distance, equation (19), gives
the result:
&, 0rj2
Var(rr) = (-----z-_)2Var(r_,)+ )(--_, ) Var(r,. (24)
( Orf lz Var(rx" ) + (____s 12 Var(r,., )4- tTqFx8 , .
+ (F) a Var(v_, )
+ (____/)2 Var(v_, )
The partial derivatives of equation (24) are determined from equation (18), for example:
0r I -(v,. - v )
)2 V 2tT_'_A 5J(VrB -- V_, +(V,, n -- ya)
(25)
3O
Thisequation(25)andtheotherpartialderivativesin equation(24) furthersimplifyto:
ar, _ : Sr,__=e,; = ; Sr,
A ar,, S% ar
0v A -_r; - _,r" - _xr; --=,_,r;Ov, A Ov _,
(26)
(27)
where r is the time-to-closest-approach, defined earlier by equation (10) or (11).
The variances of the random variables are determined next. Assume, for
convenience, that the x and y-components of the GPS horizontal position, and similarly
velocity, are independent. In reality, their independence is a function of the number and
geometry of the visible GPS satellites (even when it is assumed that the pseudorange
measurements and range rate measurements are separately (approximately) independent).
Also assume that both aircraft will use the same type of receiver (such as a six-channel
receiver) and are relatively close (within several hundred miles). Then it is also reasonable
to assume that both aircraft will see the same GPS satellites and experience the same GPS
position and velocity accuracy. Then, the standard deviation of the position measurement
error Crp is the same for both aircraft:
2
Var(r_) = Var(q,) = _,. (28)
If the velocity measurements are provided in the form of velocity vector components, then
assuming the same accuracy in both component axes, the standard deviation of the velocity
measurement error tyv is the same for both aircraft:
2
Var(vx)= Var(v.,.)=rr v . (29)
Using equations (28) and (29) and substituting the equations for the partial derivatives in
equation (26) and (27) into equation (24) gives a simple equation for the variance of the
miss distance:
Var(rj. ) = 2ff_ + 2fly2v 2. (30)
However, if the velocity vector measurements are given in terms of speed and heading,
then the analysis is different. Given the velocity vector of aircraft A or B is in the form:
= VxYC+ vy_=vsinlltJ+vcos_, (31)
then the variance of the x-component of velocity is:
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Ov), Ov 2
Var(v_) = (--_, Var(v) + (--_) Var(q/), (32)
and after evaluating the partial derivatives in equation (32), the expression simplifies to:
Var(G) = (sinl/t)-'0"_ + (vcoslV)20"a - 0"2, (33)
where 0"v and0"_ are the standard deviations of the aircraft speed and heading measurement
errors. In a similar manner, the variance of the y-component can be shown to be:
VaF(Vv ) _ 2 2= (cos_)'0",. ÷ (-vsinlp920"_, - 0"_,. (34)
Finally, the variance of the miss distance using equations (33) and (34) for both aircraft A
and B results in:
t_.2-2 0.2 2 ÷ ^2 2 2Var(r t ) = 20._ + _t ( A,,, + as,,, ) C,,r (0.a,,,, + aZ,,, ), (35)
where the subscripts A and B are important to note since different speeds and heading
angles gtA and gtB will most likely exist in equations (33) and (34) when applied to both
aircraft.
The probability of a conflict is determined next. Given the mean of the miss
distance ?j and the variance of the miss distance Var(r I) = 0"2 the probability of a conflict
r t
is determined by integrating the area under the probability distribution function between the
locations that correspond to -R and R:
R {x-_! )2
P(conflict) 1 f= e 2_ dx. (36)
0"2_/_- -R
Figure 20 shows an example. Next, using a change of variable
Gaussian error function erf(x) •
X I/2
erf(x)=-- f e- du
"J-_o
the probability of a conflict is given by:
1 R+F I
P(conflict) = _-erf( __---_)q2o.r,+
U --
(37)
(38)
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Figure 20. The miss distance probability distribution function is used to determine the
probability of a conflict (shaded area) compared to the probability of a non-
conflict (non-shaded area).
An example using this analytical method for determining non-deterministic conflicts
is given in Figure 21. In this example, the aircraft measurement uncertainties for both
aircraft are: the standard deviation on position O'p = 100 m, the standard deviation on
speed a v = 10 m/sec, and the standard deviation on heading crqt= 5 °. Note the similarity
between the Monte Carlo simulation results in Figure 19 and the analytic method in
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Figure 21. The conflict probability map using the analytic analysis.
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Figure 21. The benefit of the analytic method is that it does not require repeated
simulations to establish statistics for the probability of a conflict.
The analytic method for establishing the conflict probability map may also be used
to establish Strategic Alert Zones. The notion of an Alert Zone was first introduced in
Chapter 1 and an example was shown in Figure 1. For an airline, a Strategic Alert Zone
may determine when the probability of a conflict is high enough for the airline to initiate a
strategic maneuver. For the Alert Zone as defined by Free Flight air traffic controller
intervention, there may be yet another probability of conflict which is sufficiently high that
air traffic controllers may want to intervene. The research necessary to determine what
these probabilities should be is not covered in this report. However, for an example, if an
airline were to establish that no action should be taken by one of their pilots unless the
probability of a conflict is greater than 50%, then the Strategic Alert Zone in Figure 22
would result for the given measurement uncertainties described previously for Figure 21.
Such a Strategic Alert Zone may also be interpreted as a strategic conflict detection
mechanism.
100
Strategic Alert Zone
E
¢-
v
>.,
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
No Conflict
No Conflict
0 20 40 60 80
x (nmi)
100
Figure 22. A Strategic Alert Zone defined by a 50% probability of conflict.
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3.6 Three-Dimensional Deterministic Conflict Analysis
For the three-dimensional analysis, any arbitrary relative motion may exist for the two
aircraft. The geometry for the three-dimensional relative motion is illustrated in Figure 23.
Two geometric planes are described. First, a horizontal plane A passes through aircraft A;
this plane bisects the Protected Airspace Zone cylinder and is perpendicular to the cylinder
axis. A second plane is a skewed relative motion plane AB defined by the two aircraft
velocity vectors _A and _B. The surface normal for the relative motion plane AB is defined
by the vector cross product _a X _8" The relative motion remains in the relative motion
plane since conflict detection analysis assumes that both aircraft hold their velocity vectors
constant.
Variables defined in the moving reference frame locate the intruder aircraft B
relative to aircraft A. A moving reference frame is fixed to aircraft A with the ._-axis and
-axis residing in the horizontal plane A. If the velocity of aircraft A were to reside in the
horizontal plane A, then the J-axis would be directed toward the right wing, and the 6-
axis would be directed from the aircraft center out the aircraft nose. However, the
aircraft A may have a velocity vector that pitches out of the horizontal plane A; so the 6-
axis and the velocity vector my not necessarily align. It is assumed that neither aircraft is
banked from horizontal before a conflict resolution maneuver, so the J-axis should always
align with the direction of the right wing of aircraft A. The £,-axis is defined such that J,
m
/Horizontal Plane A _ - l-- _-- -- /
Figure 23. Relative motion of two oblivious aircraft in three-dimensions.
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_, and _ axesform a righthandsystem,thus,_ -- ._x _, andthe _.-axisalwayspoints in
theverticaldirection. In themovingreferenceframe,thevariablesx , y, and z locate the
intruder aircraft B relative to aircraft A.
Variables defined in the relative motion plane are described as follows; ? is the
Euclidean range vector locating aircraft B relative to aircraft A, defined by:
= x._ + y_, + z_., (39)
0 is the angle between the vectors FA and F8, determined from the dot product:
v..v. =I .ll BlcosO (40)
(which is not necessarily the heading difference, as for the two-dimensional analysis), _t is
the miss vector (defined later) locating the Point of Closest Approach PCA, _ is the angle-
off in the relative motion plane AB from the velocity vector _, of aircraft A to aircraft B,
and flj is the angle between the velocity vector FA and the miss vector FI' determined by
the dot product:
v. ,r, =I .l cos ,, (41)
The zero range rate line is defined to be the locus of points along the miss vector _s" While
some of these variables are defined differently from the two-dimensional analysis, the
objective of defining them in this manner allows equations (6) through (11) to directly
apply to the motion in the relative motion plane.
The miss vector ?/, as well as the time-to-closest-approach "r, may be found as
follows. At the Point of Closest Approach, the miss vector _j and the relative motion
vector g are orthogonal:
rj -c = 0. (42)
Also, the motion of aircraft B relative to aircraft A will follow in the direction of _', and
will be located at the vector location ?I at the time-to-closest-approach r :
rt = r + c "t'. (43)
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Solvingequations(42)and(43)simultaneouslyieldsthetime-to-closest-approachr"
F'C
r - (44)g.g
which may be substituted into equation (43) to evaluate the miss vector _i'
Depending on geometry, the situation may represent a pure collision, a near miss,
or no conflict. Two critical factors to examine are the zero range rate line where /" = 0 and
the range at closest approach. The motion of aircraft B relative to aircraft A will follow a
trajectory in the relative motion plane perpendicular to the zero range rate line. A pure
collision results if this trajectory is perpendicular to the zero range rate line at the origin, as
shown in Figure 23. A conflict occurs if the miss vector _/, occurring at the Point of
Closest Approach (PCA), falls within the Protected Airspace Zone (PAZ). The PAZ is
defined by a cylinder with radius R and height h, centered around aircraft A. The miss
vector _i can be expressed in the moving reference frame of aircraft A as:
_i = 5,;c + rs;:v+ rl__ (45)
A Protected Airspace Zone conflict exists if:
i) rs; < h/2 (below the upper PAZ limit), (46)
ii) rt_ > -h / 2 (above the lower PAZ limit), and (47)
iii) r 2 + < R 2s, rs' 2 (within the PAZ radius limit). (48)
While this criterion is a sufficient condition for a conflict, it is not a necessary condition.
As shown in Figure 24, the PCA may not in itself identify a conflict, but some other
portion of the line of relative motion may pass through the PAZ and cause a conflict.
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Figure 24. The Point of Closest Approach PCA may reside outside the Protected
Airspace Zone even though a conflict exists.
A necessary and sufficient condition for a conflict involves checking three specific
point locations derived from the Protected Airspace Zone and the line of relative motion.
First, let [ be the line of relative motion, defined by the vector equation:
[ = 7 + ?t (49)
for all time t. Next, define a projection operator, P, which projects a vector onto the
horizontal ._- _-plane (plane A), thus, for the vector _ =Ix y z],
P(7)= r-r.z =[xy0]. (50)
Let the under-bar notation r_-.identify the projection of 7, written P(_) = r_-. For conflict
detection, the segment s of the line of relative motion l" between the altitudes of -hi2
and +hi2 _ is investigated to identify if any part of this segment is within the distance R
from the _.-axis. In general, the line of relative motion [ is not parallel to the J?- _-plane,
but when it is, the previously stated two-dimensional analysis applies. The endpoints of
segment s are located at _L and 7U, where:
rL =r +c'rL (51)
with "rL defined by
(? + g.rL). _. = -h/2, (52)
and
7U = r +cr u (53)
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with r U defined by
(? +gvv)._ = hi2. (54)
Here, r L is the time to reach the lower altitude -hi2 _ and z"u is the time to reach the upper
altitude +hi2 _. Note that rL> v v if aircraft B approaches aircraft A from above, and
vL< z"U if aircraft B approaches aircraft A from below. Using the projection operator P, the
two vectors:
and
_L= P(_L) (55)
?v = P(Tv) (56)
are identified.
the origin:
Next, identify the vector location _, on the projected line that is closest to
"[ = _ + gt . (57)
This is achieved by solving the scalar equation:
(r_-+eZ,).c2=0 (58)
for "c,:
v, . (59)
_..g.
This defines the location:
_, = r + cv,. (60)
The three points needed to detect a conflict are _L from equation (55), ?v from equation
(56), and ?. from equation (60).
Airspace Zone PAZ conflict are:
The necessary and sufficient conditions for a Protected
i) if _L' ?L < Rz , or (61)
ii) if _j '?v < R2 , or (62)
iii) if _, ._, <_R 2 and ('cL<v,<'c v or vv<v,<vL). (63)
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Figure25 illustratestheapplicationof these conflict detection rules to identify a no
conflict and a Protected Airspace Zone conflict situation. In this example, one aircraft is
climbing near another aircraft. In the situation shown on the left plot, the relative motion
passes behind the climbing aircraft, and no conflict results. In the situation on the right
plot, the line of relative motion passes through the Protected Airspace Zone, and a violation
of conditions i) and ii) identifies a conflict.
3D PAZ Conflict Detection 3D PAZ Conflict Detection
3
. NO CONFLICT
y (nmi.) -10 -10
x (nmi.)
3.
2.
_o.
N
"1
"2
"3
CONFLICT
y (nmi.) -10 -10
x (nrni.)
Figure 25. Conflict detection for a climbing aircraft (located at the origin) and a level
aircraft (located to the upper left of the center aircraft). The intercept location
of the line of relative motion with the Protected Airspace Zone is identified
with a (o) if there is no conflict (left figure) or with a (*) if there is a conflict
(right figure) at the upper and lower separation standard altitudes.
3.7 Applying Conflict Detection to Intent Data
In general, Free Flight policy will not require a full flight plan that indicates all the
waypoints to a destination, but may require a shorter list of waypoints describing intent
data. Intent data may include a single waypoint or several waypoints (if known) extending
perhaps 10 to 20 minutes into the future from an aircraft's current state. Assuming that the
waypoints describe a piecewise linear description of the intent of each aircraft for the
immediate future, the two-dimensional or three-dimensional conflict detection criteria can
be applied to segments connecting waypoints that correspond to overlapping time intervals.
Starting with the first segment of each aircraft defined by the current position and the first
waypoint, conflict detection is performed. If a conflict occurs with a time to conflict x
before each aircraft reaches their first waypoint, then conflict resolution advisories are
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given. If the time to conflict z occurs after either of the first waypoints, the conflict may
not occur, since the change in flight paths may resolve the conflict. In this case, the next
segment in between waypoints of intent data is considered. Waypoint arrival times may not
be synchronized between aircraft, so segments between waypoints may represent different
time intervals. Only segments with overlapping time intervals are compared.
Note that this is a deterministic approach. To account for increasing uncertainty of
aircraft positions with time, a growing position error covariance envelope may be applied to
each aircraft's nominal position, as projected by the intent data. This is discussed further in
the implementation issues in Chapter 6.
3.8 Proximity Management for Multiple Aircraft
As alluded to in Chapter 2, a proximity management system for aircraft is likely to play an
important role in the system architecture. A proximity management system maintains
spatial-temporal information for all aircraft. As shown in Figure 26, a Proximity
Management system can use navigation data based on radar, FMS outputs, and GPS to
establish the location of nearby aircraft. Intent information may be derived from flight plan
data for the far term and FMS, radar, or GPS data for the near term. The size and shape of
the sector considered may be determined through either range criteria or from dynamic
density criteria. Two proximity management methods are considered: a horizontal
decomposition method based on two-dimensional Delaunay Triangulations for aircraft at
the same flight level, and a three-dimensional Delaunay Triangulation method covering all
flight levels. Delaunay Triangulations [PS85, OBS92] are spatial data structures from
computational geometry that allow for rapid identification of nearest neighbors. For nearby
air traffic, aircraft are represented as points in the triangulation, and edges identify nearest
neighbors, as shown in Figure 27.
Flight Plan Data
FMS Data
Intent Data
GPS Data
_ Dynamic Density Assessment
Aircraft Traffic Aircraft Entering Airspace
Proximity Management (Insertions)
(either/or) Aircraft Leaving Airspace
I2DFlightLevel_ l 1 (Deletions)ecomposition| 3D Method
Method ,_
Figure 26. A Proximity Management System.
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Figure 27. A Delaunay Triangulation of N aircraft at a constant flight level.
A Conflict Detection system works with Proximity Management to identify
conflicts based on future Alert Zone and Protected Airspace Zone overlaps, and can be
used to determine the effects of conflict resolution strategies on neighboring aircraft. For
tactical conflict detection, the Delaunay Triangulation can be used to detect future Protected
Airspace Zone overlaps by identifying future Delaunay Triangulation edges that will be
shorter than the horizontal separation standard length. For Alert Zone overlaps, further
conditions are applied due to the dependence of the Alert Zone on speed, heading
difference, and range (discussed in detail in Chapter 4). For the future time analysis, the
Delaunay Triangulation is advanced forward in time to detect future conflicts by looking at
projected future positions from tracking data, flight plans, and aircraft intent data.
One appropriate proximity management method is based on the Delaunay
Triangulation for points in a two-dimensional geometric plane. A triangulation is a straight
line graph partitioning of a set of N points such that no two edges intersect at any point
other than the N data points. The Delaunay Triangulation has the additional property that
the circumcircle of any triangle in the triangulation contains no point (in the set of N points)
in its interior. Given four pointsA located at (xa,YA), B located at (xB,yB), C located at
(Xc,Yc), and D located at (xD,YD), the test to identify if point D is within the circumcircle
defined by points A, B, and C is determined by the criterion [GS85]:
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XD _ ._
XA YA XA + YA
9
xB Y8 x_ +y_
9 9
Xc Yc x_ + y_
9
Yo x'D + Y'D
> 0. (64)
Equation (64) must hold for all triangles defined by the points A, B, and C in the Delaunay
Triangulation.
Several algorithms exist for constructing Delaunay Triangulations. When
considering a set of aircraft at a constant flight level, the Delaunay Triangulation of a set of
points in the (geometric) plane is applicable [FP93, LS80, OBS92]. The iterative solution
of [LS80] provides a means for introducing new aircraft to (or removing existing aircraft
from) an already existing triangulation, say for instance when an aircraft step climbs to a
new flight level.
An example of how the Delaunay Triangulation provides proximity management for
a set of aircraft within a constant flight level follows. Figure 28 illustrates the Delaunay
Triangulation for a set of aircraft composed of two streams of traffic. In addition to the
aircraft, four sector comers are used as stationary points in the Delaunay Triangulation to
identify the proximity of the aircraft to the sector boundaries. As the aircraft progress
forward, the Delaunay Triangulation changes. At any given instant, though, the nearest
neighbors of any aircraft can be identified by the edges in the Detaunay Triangulation. If a
conflict occurs, the effect a conflict resolution maneuver has on neighboring aircraft can be
evaluated, as discussed in Chapter 4 and 5.
A second appropriate proximity management method is based on the Delaunay
Triangulation defined for points in a three-dimensional Euclidean space. Delaunay
Triangulation algorithms for three dimensions are described in [OBS92]. For dynamic
data, the method of [AMGR91 ] applies. At the extreme, the Delaunay Triangulation of a
million points may be computed, as claimed by [Sui92]. However, a practical partitioning
of a flight level into dynamic sectors may break down the set of aircraft to orders of tens to
hundreds.
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Figure 28. Proximity management of aircraft at a constant flight level. Each window
depicts a snapshot of the Delaunay Triangulation at 2 minute intervals.
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4. TACTICAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION
In this chapter, tactical conflict resolution strategies are investigated. A tactical encounter
uses safety as the primary criterion for trajectory synthesis. Tactical maneuvers are derived
so that the range at the point of closest approach is maximized by using heading, speed, or
altitude maneuvers. In Free Flight, datalink will allow complete state information about
nearby aircraft to be used in the execution of optimal tactical maneuvers without knowledge
constraints. The need for tactical maneuvers should be limited to instances of hardware
failure or procedural non-adherence. This is because precautionary actions should be taken
to resolve the potential conflict long before the tactical maneuver envelope is encroached, at
a time where decisions are considered to be strategic.
The objectives of our tactical encounter research are: to evaluate different tactical
maneuvers for arbitrary initial orientations, to define a logical set of "rules-of-the-road" for
conflict resolution, to identify a tactical alert zone definition, and to evaluate how reduced
separation requirements affect the tactical maneuvers.
4.1 Tactical Heading Control Maneuvers
For horizontal maneuvers, we consider the problem of maximizing the range at the point of
closest approach, where both aircraft may execute maximum turn rate heading maneuvers.
Coordinated turns are used for heading maneuvers. In a coordinated turn, the motion
remains in the horizontal plane, with no descent rate; the steady turn rate o9 is defined by the
relationship:
09 = W = gtanO (65)
v
where W is the rate of change of the heading W, g is the gravitational acceleration, v is the
airspeed, and • is the bank angle relative to the horizontal plane. The maximum bank
angle is determined by either the maximum acceptable load factor for passenger comfort or
the maximum lift:
Lmax = 2Pv2SfLm., (66)
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Figure 29. The geometry and forces of the coordinated turn.
where p is the atmospheric density, S is the wing planform area, and CL_" is the maximum
lift coefficient. In a coordinated turn, the weight of the aircraft balances the lift as shown in
Figure 29. The relationship between the weight mg and lift L is:
mg = Lcos_ (67)
where m is the total mass of the aircraft.
maximum bank angle:
(I)max[ = COS -l,
which, when
Combining equations (66) and (67) gives the
used in equation (65),
2mg .} (68)pvZSCtm_.
determines the maximum turn rate for a maximum
bank maneuver. Additionally, in a coordinated turn the centripetal acceleration results from
the horizontal component of lift:
mftJZR = Lsin_ (69)
By combining equations (65), (67), and (69), the turn radius Rwhere R is the turn radius.
can be expressed as:
V 2
R - . (70)
g tan
Finally, the minimum turning radius R_, is obtained from equation (70) when flying at the
maximum bank angle (I)ma x .
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The role response for commanded bank angles has fairly quick dynamics for most
aircraft. For most commercial aircraft, a 2 to 5 second rise time (time to reach 90% of
maximum) can be realized for roll (bank) maneuvers. For example, in Figure 30 an
investigation of the dynamics of the Boeing 737 aircraft indicates that the rise time is
roughly 3.7 seconds to bank from steady level flight to a 45 ° bank angle. In general,
individual pilots will maneuver to different maximum bank angles based on the conflict
situation and level of experience. Additionally, the level of comfort for the passengers
degrades as higher bank angles are commanded, so there is a tendency to limit bank angles
to no more than 40 ° to 45 ° under tactical maneuvers or from 20 ° to 30° for strategic
maneuvers. A turn rate of 3°/sec is typical in the terminal area. In terms of modeling
heading maneuvers, quick changes in bank angle may be approximated as step changes.
Transients in the bank angle step response can be accounted for by considering at least a
2 to 5 second lead time prior to initiating a maneuver. For the Boeing 737 example,
Figure 31 compares the trajectory resulting from a step change in bank angle to a trajectory
with simulated aircraft dynamics. When the maneuver is initiated with sufficient lead time,
the resultant dynamics matches the instant bank maneuver quite well. Conflict advisories
can be given with sufficient lead times to account for these transients.
Maximum Bank Angle Step Response
60 _ _ _ v T
50
40
_,3o
el3
20
10
Optimal Turn Maneuver
Simulation
/
) _ 6 3.7 SeC. rise time
/
/
/'
I
7
/
I I
/
¢/
00 5 10 1 35
Boeing 737
20 30
Time (sec.)
Figure 30. Maximum bank angle step response for a Boeing 737 aircraft.
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Figure 31. A comparison between the modeled optimal maneuver and a simulation
for a Boeing 737 aircraft, and the effects of starting the maneuver with
sufficient lead time to offset the dynamics transients.
The tactical conflict resolution strategy is the result of an optimization problem:
Determine the turn rates o9A and o) B as functions of the relative motion state (r,(p,O) such
that the minimum range distance is maximized. The cost function J = r(t I) is simply the
range r at the point of closest approach, occurring at the final time tj. Euler-Lagrange
equations [Mer73, BH75] are used to solve for the tactical conflict resolution. In general,
to minimize the cost function:
J = (p(x(t I ), t I ) (71 )
for a system with time domain t o < t < t/, a set of coupled state and co-state equations must
be solved:
State: 5:= f(x, u, t) (72)
Co-State: _, tgH
oax (73)
with the controls u determined by:
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Controls: OH
-- = 0 (74)Ou
subject to the initial conditions: X(to)and final conditions:
Hamiltonian function is defined as:
The
H = ;i,rf = _f2. (75)
A two point boundary value problem results since the state is known at the initial time and
the co-state is known at the final time.
Optimal maneuvers are obtained by solving the Euler-Lagrange equations for
cooperative and non-cooperative cases. When the own aircraft A and intruder aircraft B
have the same speed and the same maximum turn rate, analytic results for the Euler-
Lagrange Equations may be found, as shown by [Mer73]. However, in general there is no
closed form analytic solution to the described optimization problem. In any of these cases,
though, numerical methods may be applied to construct maneuver charts giving the turn
rates coa and co_ as functions of the relative motion state (r,(p,O).
Example maneuver chart results are given in Figure 32. Maneuver charts are
shown for the cooperative case when the own aircraft A and intruder aircraft B have the
same speed and the same maximum turn rate. These results were computed using the
analytic equations from [Mer73]. Further maneuver charts (not shown here) are computed
using numerical methods for non-cooperative cases (o)B=0), and for cases where the two
aircraft have unequal speeds and turn rates. Given the relative motion state (r,O,O), the
location in the maneuver chart immediately identifies the cooperative maneuver, which is
identified with the notation A R for aircraft A turns Right, At. for aircraft A turns Left, B R
for aircraft B turns Right, and B L for aircraft B turns Left. The maneuver chart also
indicates the maximum miss distance that can be achieved, and a zero range rate line, for
which no maneuver is necessary once crossed.
An example trajectory of two aircraft performing an optimal tactical conflict
resolution is shown in Figure 33. In this case, the start location of the intruder aircraft falls
in the A L B L region of the maneuver chart, as shown in Figure 34, indicating that both
aircraft should perform left turns for an optimal conflict resolution. Left turns should be
applied until the relative position of the intruder aircraft B crosses the zero range rate line.
5O
This is the point of closest approach, and after crossing it, the range rate becomes positive.
In the maneuver chart, distances are normalized with respect to the turning radius of
aircraft A. As shown in the maneuver chart, the maneuver follows a level curve near the
value of 1.5, indicating that the point of closest approach will be slightly less than 1.5 times
the turning radius of aircraft A. For this example, during the entire maneuver, the heading
difference remains fixed at 90 ° , and one maneuver chart, the one shown in Figure 34, is
applied throughout the maneuver. However, if the initial conditions were chosen such that
the intruder aircraft fell in the A RB L region of the maneuver chart shown in Figure 34, then
as these aircraft performed their right and left turns, the heading difference would have
decreased to zero; several maneuver charts for fixed heading differences varying from 90°
to 0 ° would have been consulted.
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Optimal tactical conflict resolution example (cooperative case, speed
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Figure 34. The maneuver chart consulted for the optimal tactical conflict resolution
example of Figure 33 (cooperative case, speed ratio 7"= 1, and equal
turn radii).
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Dynamicprogrammingor numericalintegrationtechniquesmaybe implementedto
solvenon-equalvelocitycases.For example, dynamic programming can be applied to the
non-cooperative case for non-equal velocities as shown in Figure 35. In Figure 35, the
envelope of feasible maneuvers is shown; candidate solutions include a turn followed by a
straight line dash until the point of closest approach is reached. The optimal maneuver is
identified from the set of candidate solutions. In some cases, more than one optimal
solution may result, as shown in Figure 36, where three optimal solutions are shown.
Repeated implementation of this algorithm establishes the maneuver charts for non-
cooperative cases at a specified speed ratio. An example maneuver chart for a non-
cooperative case is shown in Figure 37.
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Figure 35. The dynamic programming search envelope for a non-cooperative case (speed
ratio ), = 2.1).
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Figure 36. The three optimal maneuvers for the non-cooperative case of Figure 35 (speed
ratio 7 = 2.1); circles highlight the points of closest approach for each of these
three optimal maneuvers.
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Figure 37. The maneuver chart for optimal tactical heading maneuvers for a non-cooperative
case (heading difference 0 = 90 °, speed ratio 7 = 2.1).
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Maneuver charts provide a generalization of optimal maneuvers given arbitrary
initial conditions. One particular set of initial conditions establishes a Tactical Alert Zone.
There exists a locus of points for which the initial conditions produce tactical maneuvers
that have the same range of 5 nmi at closest approach, which under today's regulations,
constitutes the Protected Airspace Zone. Under these conditions, for cooperative and non-
cooperative cases, maneuver charts identify a Tactical Alert Zone on the surface of which
the optimal tactical conflict resolution must be initiated in order not to penetrate the
Protected Airspace Zone of the intruder aircraft, as shown in Figure 38. The result is not a
circular or elliptic Alert Zone, as depicted in Figure l, but is dependent on the speed ratio,
range, angle-off, and heading difference. Outside this locus of points, the own aircraft
may initiate a maneuver that maximizes the miss distance, at one extreme, or a maneuver
that results in a trajectory that grazes the Protected Airspace Zone, at the other extreme.
These extremes are referred to as the upper and lower bounds of tactical conflict resolution
maneuvers.
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Figure 38. The Tactical Alert Zone: the locus of points for which a cooperative maneuver
must be initiated in order to avoid penetrating the Protected Airspace Zone (note:
+/- indicates the sign of the range rate near the zero range rate line).
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Consider next the recovery trajectories required to bring both aircraft from the point
of closest approach back to their original flight plans. Maximum bank angle maneuvers are
not necessary for returning both aircraft on track after a tactical evasive maneuver. Instead,
recovery maneuvers may be implemented using standard bank angles.
Recovery maneuvers must be coordinated so that stalemate conditions do not occur.
As shown in Figure 39, when two aircraft initiate an optimal conflict resolution, they may
end up in final conditions that may or may not allow for each aircraft to simply turn back to
its original heading without an additional conflict occurring. The stalemate condition can
last indefinitely if the two aircraft have equal speeds. If the speeds are not equal, then the
slower aircraft can perform a backside maneuver to recover while the faster aircraft
performs a frontside maneuver.
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Figure 39. Two optimal conflict resolution maneuvers have final conditions that pose
a simple recover trajectory (left) and a stalemate condition (right).
4.2 Tactical Speed Control Maneuvers
For horizontal speed control maneuvers, we consider the problem of maximizing
the range at the point of closest approach, where one or both aircraft may execute optimal
speed controls using maximum acceleration and an upper speed limit or maximum
deceleration and a lower speed limit. Under speed control, the headings of both aircraft are
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heldconstant,sothepathsremainthesamewhile thetrajectoriesvary. Thus,speedcontrol
has thedesirablefeaturethatthe aircraftneednot deviatefrom their original flight paths.
Sincepredictingwhich portionsof theairspacewill remainfreeof aircraftis easierwhen
aircraftarenot turning,workloadsmaybereducedfor air traffic controllersandpilots. On
the other hand, speedchangestakea long time, so speedcontrol maneuversmust be
performedat fairly longranges.
For most aircraft,thespeedresponsehas fairly slow dynamicsin comparisonto
headingandaltitudedynamics.For example, in Figure 40 an investigation of the dynamics
of the Boeing 737 indicates that the time to accelerate to higher speeds is in the order of 2 to
3 minutes, and in the time to decelerate to slower speeds is in the order of a minute. For
the purpose of developing maneuver charts, we consider a dynamics model with
acceleration and deceleration limits as well as upper and lower speed limits. Figure 40
illustrates the model used for speed profiles, which is also fitted into Figure 40. Starting at
an initial speed v0, the aircraft may accelerate at am_ to the upper speed limit Vm_, or
decelerate at d,_ to the lower speed limit Vm_. . At any time while accelerating
(decelerating) or while at the upper (lower) speed limit, the aircraft may reach the Point of
Closest Approach PCA.
Speed Acceleration/Deceleration
r = i i r J l
._ 410
_4oo
/
380 Optimal Speed Control Maneuver
370 Simulation
/_ / Boeing 737360 _ - ..............................
350 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
Time (sec.)
Figure 40. Maximum acceleration and deceleration responses for a Boeing 737 aircraft
(34,000 ft operating condition).
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A speedcontrolconflict resolutionstrategyis theresultof anoptimizationproblem:
Determinethespeedsva and vB as functions of the relative motion state (r,¢),O) such that
the minimum range is maximized. The payoff function is simply the range r at the point of
closest approach. In general, the equations of motion are defined by equations (1) to (3),
with zero turn rates, and with speed control variables va and vs being chosen to follow
one of the two speed profiles shown in Figure 41. Equations (1) to (3) apply for the
derivation of speed control maneuvers with the turn rates OgA=0 and c0s=0. Consequently,
the heading difference 0 remains constant.
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• "- " t Time
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Time of Time to Time to Time to Time to
Speed Lower Upper PCA using to PCA using
Maneuver Speed Speed Lower Speed Upper Speed
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Figure 41. Each aircraft is limited by upper and lower speed limits and a maximum
acceleration and deceleration.
Optimal speed control maneuvers may be obtained by solving Euler-Lagrange
equations for cooperative and non-cooperative cases. We have implemented numerical
methods to construct maneuver charts that indicate whether each aircraft should go faster or
slower as a function of the relative motion state (r,(_,O). Speed control maneuver charts
are generated for a fixed heading difference 0, which remains constant throughout the
maneuver. For non-cooperative maneuvers, the velocity of aircraft B does not change, so
maneuver charts may be generated for fixed heading differences 0 and a fixed speed v B.
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Given the speedof aircraftB to be fixed atvB, the maneuver chart identifies if aircraft A
should speed up to a minimum speed ratio )',_n = vB/vA max' or if aircraft A should slow
down to a maximum speed ratio )'m_x = vB/v,_ _. For cooperative maneuvers, the optimal
speeds of aircraft A and aircraft B will be either minimum and maximum, respectively,
where the speed ratio becomes a minimum Y,_n = VBn_n/Va max' or the optimal speeds of
aircraft A and aircraft B will be maximum and minimum, respectively, where the speed
ratio becomes a maximum Ym_x = VB,,,_/VA r_,,"
The final conditions for a speed maneuver may or may not occur when one or both
aircraft are at maximum or minimum speed limits. In the limiting case, both aircraft may be
at their initial speeds and be oriented such that the aircraft B is located on the zero range rate
line. Thus, the zero range rate line is determined by the initial velocities, rather than with
the maximum and minimum velocities. For initial conditions with negative range rate close
to the zero range rate line, the aircraft may reach the Point of Closest Approach with one or
both of the aircraft still accelerating or decelerating to the upper or lower speed limit. In the
maneuver chart, contour lines indicate the locus of points with equal maximum miss
distance; initial conditions which represent points on these contour lines may have different
final conditions and Points of Closest Approach. In terms of how the maneuver chart is
used to guide conflict resolution, this means that during conflict resolution, the maneuver
chart changes as the speeds are changing, and the maneuver chart only remains fixed when
both aircraft have achieved upper or lower speed limits. Given the initial speeds of each
aircraft, the maneuver chart indicates which aircraft should speed up or slow down and the
final miss distance if the optimal maneuver is followed; however, the maneuver chart does
not indicate the Point of Closest Approach unless the range rate is zero.
Example speed control maneuver chart results that incorporate a limited
acceleration/deceleration dynamics model are given in Figures 42 through 45. Maneuver
charts are shown for non-cooperative cases in Figures 42 and 43 and for cooperative cases
in Figures 44 and 45. Given the relative motion state (r,q_,0), the location in the maneuver
chart immediately identifies which aircraft should go faster or slower. The optimal speed is
identified with the notation A A for aircraft A to accelerate to the upper speed limit, A o for
aircraft A to decelerate to the lower speed limit, B a for aircraft B to accelerate to the upper
speed limit, Bo for aircraft B to decelerate to the lower speed limit, or B 0 for aircraft B
holds constant speed (the non-cooperative case). For non-cooperative maneuvers, the
maneuver chart is indexed by the speed vB of aircraft B, which is labeled on the chart. For
59
cooperativemaneuvers,the maneuverchart is indexedby bothaircraftspeedsvA and v_.
For all maneuver charts shown, the upper speed limit for both aircraft is v,,_ = 550 kts, and
the lower speed limit for both aircraft is Vmj.= 350 kts. The maximum acceleration is a,,_=
I kt/sec and the maximum deceleration is din,x= 1 kt/sec. (These speeds and acceleration
limits are parameters that can be changed for other scenarios.) The maneuver chart also
indicates the optimal miss distance contours for odd distances ( 1,3,5 .... nmi) that can be
achieved if the optimal maneuver is applied, and a zero range rate line (indicated by + for
positive and - for negative range rate), for which no maneuver is necessary once crossed.
Non-Cooperative Speed Control Maneuver Charts
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Figure 42. Speed control maneuver charts incorporating a limited
acceleration/deceleration model; fixed maneuver heading difference and
varying speeds for Aircraft B (non-cooperative case).
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Figure 43. Speed control maneuver charts incorporating a limited
acceleration/deceleration model considering different maneuver heading
differences (non-cooperative case).
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Figure 44. Speed control maneuver charts incorporating a limited
acceleration/deceleration model; fixed maneuver heading difference and
varying speeds for Aircraft B (cooperative case; vA0 = 450 kts).
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incorporating a limited
acceleration/deceleration model considering different maneuver heading
differences (cooperative case; VA0 = 450 kts and vs0 = 450 kts).
As was shown for heading maneuvers, one particular set of initial conditions
establishes a Tactical Alert Zone (TAZ). There exists a locus of points for which the initial
conditions produce tactical speed maneuvers that all have the same range of 5 nmi at closest
approach, which under today's separation standards, constitutes the Protected Airspace
Zone. Under these conditions, for cooperative and non-cooperative cases, maneuver charts
identify a TAZ on the surface of which the optimal tactical conflict resolution must be
initiated in order not to penetrate the Protected Airspace Zone of the intruder aircraft.
Figure 41 shows the TAZ for both non-cooperative and cooperative cases. Notice also that
the TAZ for heading maneuvers is considerably smaller than the TAZ for speed maneuvers
(cf. Figure 38 and Figure 46). As was the case for heading maneuvers, the TAZ result is
not a circular or elliptic Alert Zone, as depicted in Figure 1, but is dependent on the speed
ratio, range, angle-off, and heading difference.
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Figure 46. A non-cooperative (left) and cooperative (right) Tactical Alert Zone: the locus of
points for which a maneuver must be initiated in order to avoid penetrating the
Protected Airspace Zone (+/- indicates the sign of the range rate, vA0= 425
kts, vB0= 500 kts).
Recovery trajectories bringing both aircraft from the point of closest approach back
to their original flight plans include simple accelerations or declarations. Since both aircraft
finish the speed control maneuver with positive range rate, and since both aircraft do not
change their heading during the maneuver, the recovery maneuver is simply to accelerate or
decelerate back to the original time schedule for each aircraft. No further conflicts or
stalemate conditions may result. Alternatively, each aircraft can return to their original
speeds at any rate of acceleration or deceleration or can accept the delay in time (if the
aircraft decelerated during the conflict resolution maneuver) or advance in time (if the
aircraft accelerated during the conflict resolution maneuver) from their original schedule.
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4.3 Tactical Altitude Control Maneuvers
For altitude control maneuvers, we consider the problem of maximizing the vertical
range with sufficient clearance of the Protected Airspace Zone. One or both aircraft may
execute optimal climb or descent controls using maximal climb and descent rates. Under
altitude control, the headings of both aircraft are held constant, so the paths of both aircraft
remain in vertical geometric planes. Since the vertical separation requirements for the
Protected Airspace Zone are much smaller than the horizontal requirements, and since climb
and descent rates are fairly time responsive, altitude maneuvers have the beneficial quality
that they may be used at the last minute. They also have the benefit of holding the heading
of each aircraft constant, which allows for pilots and air traffic controllers to more easily
predict the portions of the airspace that will remain free of aircraft.
In general, the geometry for altitude maneuvers is three-dimensional, although the
relative motion of the two aircraft will reside in a two-dimensional plane. Assume that both
aircraft have constant velocity vectors. For each aircraft, the velocity vector _ is oriented at
the heading W measured clockwise from North, at the flight path angle ?' from the
horizontal plane, and at the bank angle _ relative to the horizontal plane, as shown in
Figure 47. It is assumed that the initial heading and flight path angles may be non-zero, and
the bank angle is zero for this three-dimensional analysis. As was shown in Figure 23, the
relative motion of two conflicting aircraft with constant velocity vectors defines a skewed
relative motion plane; the relative motion plane is a horizontal plane if and only if both
velocity vectors have zero flight path angle.
_North
_. _ [ /) i_"- 7" Velocity
Bank-An_ _ _'^'/ Fl_glht Path
^ ___f P__space Z_ "_
x East
Figure 47. The orientation of the velocity vector for an aircraft.
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The model for the vertical maneuver holds the horizontal speed constant as the
vertical speed changes. Figure 48 illustrates the model. Vertical maneuvers will generally
involve small changes in flight path angle in the order of 5° to l0 °. Since the horizontal
component of velocity remains fixed, when two aircraft climb or descend in a coordinated
effort to maximize vertical separation, there is no change with respect to the horizontal
component of relative velocity. The relative horizontal trajectory remains on the same
horizontal path as before the vertical maneuver was initiated.
Figure 48. The vertical maneuver model where the horizontal component of the velocity
remains constant while the vertical component changes.
The goal for the vertical maneuver is to have the intersection of the relative motion
line occur on the upper or lower rim of the Protected Airspace Zone, as to just clear the
separation requirements. Figure 49 illustrates two candidate goal locations for a given initial
relative orientation of two aircraft. To determine a particular goal location requires a
geometric analysis including the initial conditions and the optimal control strategy defined
above. The projection of the line of relative motion onto the horizontal plane, defined as /_-
by equation (57) in the conflict detection section of this report, determines the cross
sectional area. Assuming that a conflict exists, this projected line intercepts the Protected
Airspace Zone at two points, as shown in the drawing in Figure 49. The point on the line
l_ that is closest to the origin is located at the position _,, which can be expressed in terms
of the relative motion vector _ and the location _ of Aircraft B relative to Aircraft A as
follows (by substituting eq. (59) into eq. (60)):
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(76)
The width w of the cross sectional area is defined from the right triangle with sides _,
w/2, and R, as illustrated in Figure 50, thus:
r, 2 + = R 2 . (77)
The width w is:
w = 2_/R 2- 2 (78)
Finally, determining whether the location of the candidate goal location should be the closer
or farther location on the rim depends on the case being cooperative or non-cooperative. If
the altitude maneuver is a cooperative maneuver, both the candidate goal locations will be
on the near side of the upper and lower rim of the Protected Airspace Zone. If the altitude
maneuver is a non-cooperative maneuver, then the location of the candidate goal location
will be on the farther side of the rim of the Protected Airspace Zone when the maneuvering
aircraft has inferior performance relative to the steady state climb or descent rate of the non-
cooperative aircraft; the cases are defined, and examples are given later in this section.
Canld_ate _ "_-at,on_--_'_" CaondiLdatceation
Figure 49. The line of relative motion determines a rectangular planar intersection with the
Protected Airspace Zone and two candidate goal locations for a vertical
maneuver.
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Figure 50. In the planview, the projection of the line of relative motion intercepts the
Protected Airspace Zone and defines two candidate goal locations.
The response to commanded climb and descent rates has fairly quick dynamics for
most aircraft. For most commercial aircraft, a 5 to 10 second rise time (time to reach 90%
of maximum) can be realized for climb and descent maneuvers. For example, in Figure 51
an investigation of the dynamics of the Boeing 737 aircraft indicates that the rise time is
roughly 9.9 seconds to climb from steady level flight to a maximum climb rate of
700 ft/minute and 9.4 seconds to descend to a maximum descent rate of 1500 ft/minute.
With these rates, the Boeing 737 can achieve a 1000 ft separation from a non-cooperative
aircraft in about 90 seconds for climb maneuvers and in about 40 seconds for a descent
maneuver. In general, individual pilots will maneuver with different rates based on the
conflict situation and level of experience. Climb rates are generally less than descent rates
(which take advantage of gravity). Also, the loss of velocity in a climb maneuver will
cause many pilots to reduce or level off a tactical climb maneuver after 10 to 20 seconds. In
terms of modeling vertical maneuvers, quick changes in flight path angle are modeled by
step changes in climb and descent rate.
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Figure 5 I. The dynamics of maximum climb and descent rates for a Boeing 737 aircraft.
Transients in altitude maneuvers may be accounted for by an appropriate lead time
for initiating a maneuver. A lead time from 2 to 5 seconds is necessary for most aircraft.
For the Boeing 737 example in Figure 51, the trajectory resulting from a step change in
climb and descent rate is compared to a trajectory with simulated dynamics in Figure 52.
When the maneuver is initiated with sufficient lead time, the resultant dynamics matches the
desired optimal maneuver quite well, as shown in Figure 53 for a climb maneuver and in
Figure 54 for a descent maneuver. Conflict advisories can be given with sufficient lead
times to account for these transients.
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Figure 52. A comparison between the modeled optimal climb and descent maneuvers and a
simulation for a Boeing 737.
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Figure 53. The effects of starting a climb maneuver with sufficient lead time to offset
the dynamics transients.
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Figure 54. The effects of starting a descent maneuver with sufficient lead time to offset
the dynamics transients.
An altitude control conflict resolution strategy is the result of an optimization
problem: Determine the vertical speeds (climb or descent rates) _t and _B of aircraft A
and B as functions of the relative motion state (r,¢p,O,z) such that the altitude separation is
maximized. The payoff function is the relative vertical separation z at the Protected Airspace
Zone goal location. In general, the equations of motion are defined by equations ( 1) to (4),
with the turn rates C0A=0 and C0B=0, constant horizontal speeds vA and vB, and vertical
speeds _A and _A being chosen from maximum and minimum allowable climb and
descent rates. Consequently, the heading difference 0 remains constant, and the relative
horizontal velocities remain constant. Furthermore, the vertical velocity equation, or the
altitude difference equation, is uncoupled with the horizontal equations. It is assumed that
there are no vertical acceleration constraints, and either aircraft can increase or decrease
flight path angle by a small amount enough to create the vertical velocity components 1_1_'a
and o%A .
Optimal altitude control maneuvers may be obtained by solving Euler-Lagrange
Equations for cooperative and non-cooperative cases. We have implemented numerical
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methodsto constructmaneuverchartsthatindicatewhethereachaircraftshouldclimb or
descendasafunctionof therelativemotionstate(r,(_,O,z).
Examplealtitudecontrolmaneuverchartresultsaregivenin Figures55 through58.
Theoptimalaltitudemaneuveris identifiedwith thenotationA c for aircraft A to climb, A D
for aircraft A to descend, B c for aircraft B to climb, Bo for aircraft B to descend, or B 0
for aircraft B holds constant climb or descent rate (the non-cooperative case). The
maneuver chart also indicates the optimal miss distance contours for 2000 ft distances
(equivalent to the vertical separation standard) that can be achieved if the optimal maneuver
is applied, and a clearance line, for which no maneuver is necessary once crossed.
Figure 55 illustrates a maneuver chart for a cooperative case. In this example, the
maneuver chart is established for a cross velocity heading directly into the center of the
Protected Airspace Zone; the cross section of the Protected Airspace Zone has a length of
10 nmi and height of 2000 ft. Once an aircraft climbs above or descends below the
Protected Airspace Zone, it should hold a zero relative climb rate until clear of the far side
of the Protected Airspace Zone.
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Figure 55. A cooperative altitude control maneuver chart.
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Figure 56 through58 illustratemaneuvercharts for a non-cooperativecases. In
theseexamples,maneuverchartsareestablishedfor acrossvelocityheadingdirectly into
thecenterof theProtectedAirspaceZone;thecrosssectionof theProtectedAirspaceZone
hasa lengthof I0 nmi andheightof 2000ft. Thereare threecasesfor non-cooperative
maneuvercharts. First, thecasewhenthenon-cooperativeaircraftA is climbing with a
constantpositiverateandaircraftB hasalowermaximumclimb rate:
Non-CooperativeCaseI:
_A -> t_YB > 0. (79)
In this case, the goal locations are at the far upper rim of the Protected Airspace Zone cross
section for climb maneuvers, and at the near lower rim of the Protected Airspace Zone
cross section for descent maneuvers. Once an aircraft climbs above or descends below the
Protected Airspace Zone, it is clear from a separation conflict.
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Figure 56. A non-cooperative altitude control maneuver chart for an aircraft with
inferior climb performance relative to a non-cooperative climbing Aircraft A.
In the second case, the non-cooperative aircraft A is either climbing with a constant
positive rate and aircraft B has a higher maximum climb rate, or aircraft A is descending
with a constant negative rate and aircraft B has a lower negative descent rate:
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Non-Cooperative Case lJ:
_PJVB > O_VA > 0 or (80)
_B < _a < 0. (81)
In this case, the goal locations are at the near upper and lower rim of the Protected Airspace
Zone cross section for climb and descent maneuvers, respectively. Once an aircraft climbs
above or descends below the Protected Airspace Zone, it is clear from a separation conflict.
Once aircraft B climbs above or descends below the Protected Airspace Zone, it should
hold a zero relative climb rate until clear of the far side of the Protected Airspace Zone.
This non-cooperative case maneuver chart is very similar to the cooperative case maneuver
chart, with the exception of the relative climb and descent rates have smaller magnitude due
to the non-cooperative situation.
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Figure 57. A non-cooperative altitude control maneuver chart for two aircraft with
dissimilar climb and descent rate capabilities.
In the third case, the non-cooperative aircraft A is descending with a constant negative rate
and aircraft B has a higher minimum descent rate:
Non-Cooperative Case III: 0 > 6v B > o%A. (82)
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In this case, the goal locations are at the near upper rim of the Protected Airspace Zone
cross section for climb maneuvers, and at the far lower rim of the Protected Airspace Zone
cross section for descent maneuvers. Once an aircraft climbs above or descends below the
Protected Airspace Zone, it is clear from a separation conflict.
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Figure 58. A non-cooperative altitude control maneuver chart for an aircraft with inferior
descent performance relative to a non-cooperative descending Aircraft A.
As was shown for heading and speed maneuvers, one particular set of initial
conditions establishes a Tactical Alert Zone. There exists a locus of points for which the
initial conditions produce tactical altitude maneuvers that all have the same vertical
separation clearance of 2000 ft at closest approach, which under today's regulations,
constitutes the Protected Airspace Zone. Under these conditions, for cooperative and non-
cooperative cases, maneuver charts identify a Tactical Alert Zone on the surface of which
the optimal tactical conflict resolution must be initiated in order not to penetrate the
Protected Airspace Zone of the intruder aircraft. Figure 59 (a) shows the Tactical Alert
Zone for the cooperative case, and Figure 59 (b) shows the Tactical Alert Zone for the
three non-cooperative cases.
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Figure 59. Cooperative (a) and non-cooperative (b) altitude control Tactical Alert Zone cases.
4.4 Tactical Alert Zone Visualization
The Tactical Alert Zones for heading, speed, and altitude control may be viewed in
a three-dimensional perspective view to aid a pilot or air traffic controller in understanding
the control options at any given moment. This investigation is in part motivated by the
work of Ford [F86] where the protected volume of airspace is identified for TCAS II. The
assumptions for the derivation of heading control maneuvers was that both aircraft were in
the same horizontal plane. However, the same results apply if both aircraft are flying
trajectories in horizontal planes that are separated by less than the vertical separation
requirement (currently 1000 ft). Thus, the Tactical Alert Zone region that is derived in a
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horizontalplanecanbeextendedaboveandbelowanintruderaircraftby the distanceof the
separationstandard.Thisappliesfor bothheadingandspeedcontrol. Figures60 and 61
illustratestheTacticalAlert Zonefor two aircraftatnearlythesamealtitude.
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Figure 60. The 3D perspective view of Tactical Alert Zones; a comparison between
speed control vs. heading control (left), and a comparison between
altitude control vs. heading control (right).
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Figure 61. The 3D perspective view of Tactical Alert Zones for heading and speed
control (taken from [ADK96] with permission from the authors).
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TacticalAlert Zones(TAZs)aroundanaircraftadvisewhatcontrollogic shouldbe
appliedfor conflict resolution. In Figure60, the left aircraft is locatedwithin the speed
controlTAZ, andthuscannotavoidpenetratingtheProtectedAirspaceZoneof the intruder
aircraftwithout using anothermodeof control. Sincethe aircraft is locatedoutsidethe
headingcontrol TAZ, a cooperativeheadingmaneuverremainsan option for conflict
resolution.
TacticalAlert Zonesand the ProtectedAirspaceZonesare two important safety
regions that, under a Free Flight policy, pilots and air traffic managersmust clearly
visualize to effectivelyperform conflict detectionand resolution.TacticalAlert Zones
cannotbe easilygeneralizedin termsof heuristicsthat a pilot or air traffic managercan
apply in anothernon-visualmode. Displaying theseregionsaround the aircraft could
greatlyaid bothpilots andair traffic managersby presentingconflict resolutionadvisory
information in a visually immersive presentation. The theoretical and algorithmic
backgroundbehindthesesafetyregionsisretainedwithin thecomputer.
4.5 Multi-Aircraft Tactical Encounters
A heuristic approach to multi-aircraft tactical conflict resolution may be applied using 2-
aircraft conflict detection and resolution primitives. Consider the following heuristic
algorithm which is stated for a 3-aircraft scenario:
1) Given 3 aircraft located in close proximity, determine the time-to-closest-
approach for each pair of aircraft. Prioritize each pair of aircraft based on
time-to-closest-approach. Identify the highest priority pair of aircraft as A
and B, and the other aircraft as C.
2) For A and B, allow A and B to commit to resolve their conflict with a
cooperative conflict resolution strategy. After A and B achieve a positive
range rate, direct A and B to return to their original headings with
appropriate recovery maneuvers.
3) If C comes in conflict with either A or B while A and B are committed to a
cooperative maneuver, perform a non-cooperative conflict resolution
strategy with C relative to the closer aircraft A or B (based on time-to-
closest-approach to A or B) using the other aircraft from A or B as a
constraint. A reachability conflict detection mechanism (see Chapter 3) is
necessary here since both A and B is maneuvering.
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4) If A and B resolve their conflict without becoming in conflict with C, then
return to Step 1, or if all aircraft have positive range rates relative to each
other, then the encounter is over.
This approach to 3-aircraft conflict resolution is a heuristic approach; it does not guarantee
that all aircraft avoid each other successfully. Notice that in Step 3, aircraft C must perform
a non-cooperative conflict resolution strategy with the closer of aircraft A and B. As noted,
detecting this conflict should be performed with a reachability conflict detection
mechanism, as described in Chapter 3 and illustrated in Figures 13 and 14. However, a
complication may result even if the conflict is detected with a reachability type mechanism,
because after conflict detection, aircraft C performs a non-cooperative conflict resolution.
In this report, non-cooperative conflicts assume that the intruder aircraft is flying a straight
path, which is not going to be the case for a 3-aircraft maneuver. Thus, there is no
guarantee that the non-cooperative maneuver for aircraft C relative to A or B described in
step 3 will be performed successfully. Aircraft C is in danger because either aircraft A or B
may be performing turns that are counterproductive with respect to the safety objective of
aircraft C. The worst case situation for aircraft C must consider that aircraft A and B are
both turning in counterproductive directions (analogous to a suicidal aircraft) while aircraft
C maximizes miss distance. In this report, we have not investigated such non-cooperative
maneuvers; however, this 3-aircraft example illustrates the need for such an investigation.
Figures 62 through 66 illustrate a 3-aircraft encounter that uses the above heuristic
approach for conflict resolution. The scenario considers only heading maneuvers for three
aircraft flying at the same altitude. In Figure 62, the points of closest approach for each
pair of aircraft are displayed assuming that no aircraft maneuvers from a straight constant
speed flight. Dashed circles with 5 nmi radii help display the separation conflicts that
occur. Figure 63 illustrates the conflict resolution strategy that results from the heuristic
algorithm. Aircraft A and B have highest priority since the time-to-closest-approach
between A and B will occur before the time-to-closest-approach between A and C or B
and C. First, aircraft A and B perform left turns, as indicated by the tactical alert zone
shown in Figure 64. After aircraft A clears the zero range rate line of aircraft B, a second
conflict occurs just as aircraft B starts to perform a recovery maneuver from the conflict
resolution with aircraft A. As shown in Figure 65, a second application of the conflict
resolution tactical alert zone advisories allows for the safe passage of aircraft C to the
backside of aircraft B; however, the motion of aircraft C then becomes counter productive
with respect to the safety of aircraft A. Aircraft A performs a non-cooperative maneuver
towards the side of aircraft A that is free of congestion, as shown in Figure 65. Finally, as
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shownin Figure66,all aircraftperformrecoverymaneuversbackto their originalcourses.
This exampleexhibitsa particularlydifficult tacticalmulti-aircraftconflict situationwhere
three aircraft are convergingto a single location, which could occur in Free Flight.
However, this type of 3-aircraftmaneuvershould be consideredvery unlikely, since
strategicmaneuvershouldbeperformedprior to this tacticalencounter.
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Figure 62. A 3-aircraft conflict detection example where no conflict resolution
maneuvers are executed (o denotes points of closest approach).
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Figure 63. A 3-aircraft conflict detection and resolution example (* denotes the location
when a conflict resolution maneuver is initiated; o denotes points of closest
approach).
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Figure 64. The 3-aircraft conflict resolution maneuver between aircraft A, B, and C; the
Tactical Alert Zone of aircraft B is shown with aircraft A just clearing the zero
range rate line (taken from [ADK96] with permission from the authors).
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Figure 65. The 3-aircraft conflict resolution maneuver between aircraft A, B, and C; the
Tactical Alert Zone of aircraft C is shown with aircraft B maneuvering away
from aircraft C (taken from [ADK96] with permission from the authors).
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Figure 66. The 3-aircraft conflict resolution maneuver between aircraft A, B, and C; the
Tactical Alert Zone of aircraft C is shown with aircraft B finishing the
maneuvering away from aircraft C and aircraft A initiating a recovery maneuver
(taken from [ADK96] with permission from the authors).
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Thesubjectof multi-aircraftconflict detectionandresolutionis a complexchallenge
for FreeFlight, andshouldbe investigatedasasubjectin itself. The cooperativeandnon-
cooperativeconflictresolutionstrategiesof this reportmay serveasa goodbasisfor such
an investigation. As notedfrom the investigationof a 3-aircraftexample,an additional
analysisof proximity managementmust be carried along for multi-aircraft scenarios.
Figure 67 illustratesthe threecomponentsneededfor multi-aircraftscenarios:1) multi-
aircraftproximity management,2) multi-aircraftconflict detection,and 3) multi-aircraft
conflict resolution.
I Multi-Aircraft [Proximity Management
Multi-Aircraft H Multi-AircraftConflict Detection Conflict Resolution
Figure 67. Tasks for multi-aircraft conflict detection and resolution.
The proximity management system maintains spatial-temporal proximity
information for all aircraft. The proximity management system would manage surveillance
data including radar and GPS to establish the current location of aircraft as well as intent
data including flight plans. The size and shape of the sector analyzed should be determined
through the results of dynamic density measurements. In Chapter 3, a proximity
management system based on Delaunay Triangulations was presented; such a proximity
management system would be adequate for multi-aircraft scenarios.
Conflict detection works with proximity management to identify conflicts based on
present and future Tactical and Strategic Alert Zone and Protected Airspace Zone overlaps,
and runs cluster analysis and free space analysis in order to support conflict resolution.
Cluster analysis may be performed on the aircraft position data to identify aircraft in close
temporal and spatial proximity, based on time-to-closest-approach and range at the point-
of-closest-approach. Further analysis of clusters of neighboring aircraft also indicates
where there is a potential for the domino effect in conflict resolution, where the conflict
resolution between a subset of aircraft propagates further conflicts that may or may not
have been directly connected with the original subset of conflicting aircraft. Cluster
analysis also identifies the free space for conflict resolution. It is important to note that the
conflict resolution free space changes as a function of time, and this free space must be
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analyzedfrom the currenttime through the end time of conflict resolution. The time
requiredfor aconflict resolutionis identifiedby atime until achievinga zerorangeratefor
anypair of two aircraft,asdiscussedin thisreport.
The 3-aircraft conflict detectionand resolution examplegiven above provides
insight into the complexityof multi-aircraftconflict resolution. Free spaceanalysis is
neededto comparetheavailablefree spacedeterminedby conflict detectionto maneuver
envelopeneedsfor pairsof conflictingaircraftwith constraintsimposedby third, fourth, or
moreaircraftlocatednearby.Heuristicalgorithms,like theonegivenaboveor thegenetic
algorithmbasedsolutiongivenin [DAC96], mustbe investigatedfor feasibility to identify
theirweakpoints.A fully cooperativemaneuverwith 3 or moreaircraftcoordinatingtheir
motionmaybenecessaryto guaranteesafety.
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5. STRATEGIC CONFLICT RESOLUTION
In this chapter, strategic conflict resolution strategies are investigated. Whereas the tactical
encounter is concerned primarily with safety (maintaining separation), the strategic
encounter is concerned with economics as well as safety. Economics is treated by
considering direct operating costs, composed of fuel and flight time costs, involved in
maneuvering to avoid a conflict. In this way, one of the primary objectives of Free Flight,
namely, enhancement of flight efficiency, is being addressed. The objectives of our
strategic encounter research are: to evaluate different strategic maneuvers for arbitrary initial
conditions, to evaluate the direct operating cost of a maneuver, to define a logical set of
"rules-of-the-road" for conflict resolution, and to evaluate the economical savings of
reduced separation requirements.
Under the strategic evasion scenario, the intent is to sufficiently achieve the required
separation while minimizing economic factors. Economic factors may include: reducing
time delay, fuel cost, and direct operating cost, in addition to minimizing conflicts with
other (third aircraft) traffic, and minimizing passenger discomfort. This might lead to the
selection of any of a set of standard maneuvers: heading, speed, or altitude control, or a
combination of these. In all these cases, the emphasis will be on minimum deviations of
the original flight track while achieving the required minimum separation distance at closest
approach. An opposing criteria, which leads to initiating these maneuvers closer to the
intruding aircraft, is the uncertainty in accurately predicting the time and location of the
point of closest approach. Hence, while the desire to minimize the economic penalty leads
to a gradual maneuver at a longer initial range, a tradeoff exists due to the uncertainty at the
longer range in predicting the actual separation at closest approach as well as accurately
performing the conflict resolution guidance maneuver.
In the sections that follow, first strategic heading control maneuvers are
investigated, followed by speed control and altitude control maneuvers. After
investigations of the theory of these maneuvers are presented, the economics of these
maneuvers is investigated. Finally, these strategic results are combined with tactical
conflict resolution results in one set of "rules-of-the-road".
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5. I Strategic Heading Control Maneuvers
Strategic heading control maneuvers are investigated with the following assumptions. It is
assumed that the heading maneuver performed will consist of a series of standard vectoring
maneuvers (heading changes) such that straight line motion occurs in between heading
changes. The time and distance to implement the change in heading for one or both aircraft
is small in comparison to the time and distance of the overall maneuver. Heading
maneuvers are performed in the horizontal plane with standard turn rates. No uncertainty
analysis will be performed in the design of heading maneuvers, although the effects of
uncertainties was investigated in Chapter 3 to determine if a maneuver should or should not
be initiated for a given set of initial conditions. Finally, non-cooperative and cooperative
cases will be considered for strategic heading maneuvers.
The design of strategic heading maneuvers considers an arbitrary initial condition, a
separation constraint, and several possible final conditions. As done in previous analysis,
the motion of aircraft B may be described relative to aircraft A in the moving reference
frame of aircraft A. Aircraft B will follow a trajectory in the direction of the line of relative
motion if no heading maneuver is performed. If the line of relative motion does not pierce
the Protected Airspace Zone, then there is no need for a conflict resolution maneuver.
Thus, there is a limited region of initial conditions for which heading maneuvers are
necessary, as shown in Figure 68. The horizontal separation constraint, currently
established at 5 nmi, thus requires the relative motion to pass around the Protected Airspace
Zone. Optimal paths [Mi86] around circular obstacles, namely the Protected Airspace
Zone, consist of straight line segments tangent to the circular obstacle and arcs of the
circular obstacle - the portion of the optimal path that passes along the arc is sometimes
referred to as in the saturated constraint period [DAC95]. The final condition establishes
the point of departure from the circular arc around the separation constraint. Three final
conditions may be appropriate: return both aircraft back to track using a symmetric heading
maneuver, return both aircraft back to course (original heading), or return both aircraft
towards their next waypoints (a heading angle typically in between the angles required for
the return to course and return to track). With these final conditions, the point of departure
from the circular arc constraint is determined by the point of tangency between the circular
constraint and the symmetric point for return to track, the point of tangency that matches the
original course direction for the return to course, and a point of tangency determined by the
next waypoints for the return to the next waypoints.
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Figure68. Optimalstrategicheadingmaneuvergeometry(non-cooperativecase).
Therequiredheadingchangefor a strategicheadingmaneuvercanbederivedfrom
the maneuvergeometry. Figure 69 illustrates the geometry for a non-cooperative
maneuver. For non-cooperativemaneuvers,feasiblemaneuversare describedby all
relativemotionvectorsc = v B - "_A,with VA fixed in magnitude and direction, and _B fixed
in magnitude but free to change in direction using a standard turn rate. Assume that the
amount of time the heading change requires is small in comparison to the time to closest
approach, so an instantaneous change in heading is considered for modeling strategic
heading maneuvers. There are two maneuvers shown in Figure 69, a frontside and
backside maneuver. The frontside maneuver is described by aircraft B changing its
velocity vector to _B+ such that the resultant relative motion vector becomes _+. The
relative motion line for the frontside maneuver is tangent to the Protected Airspace Zone
circle; the point of tangency is located by the unit direction vector /3+. Likewise, the
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backsidemaneuverisdescribedby thevelocityvector _B-, therelativemotionvector _-,
andthepointof tangencylocatedwith theunit directionvector/_-.
Frontside
_:_ Maneuver
FeasibleManeuvers:
Locus of all c vectors Backside
Maneuver
/flProtected
Airspace
Zone
Line of Relative Motion
with No Maneuver
Figure 69. The relative geometry for strategic frontside and backside heading maneuvers.
The point of tangency location is determined by geometry. The projection of the
range vector P and the unit direction vector/_ pointing to the point of tangency gives:
P./_ = R (83)
where /_ could be either the frontside or backside unit direction vector, and R is the desired
miss distance. This equation (83) can be expressed in the scalar form:
xflx + yfly = R (84)
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wheretheunit directionvectoris /)= fix _ + fl>._ and the location of aircraft B relative to
aircraft A is at (x,y), as shown in Figure 70. Furthermore, since the vector /3 is a unit
vector, it has unit magnitude:
/_x 2 "l-/_y2 ---- 1. (85)
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Figure 70. The vector analysis for frontside and backside heading maneuvers.
Combining equations (84) and (85) gives a quadratic equation:
r2,O>2 - 2Ry_ + (R 2 - x 2) = 0 (86)
which has the two real solutions: fl>l and _y2" (It is easy to show that as long as aircraft B
is outside the Protected Airspace Zone of aircraft A, then these solutions are real numbers.)
Next, given either fl,. =fl>l or fl:=fly2' the value for fix can be determined from:
R- y&,
/_, - m (87)
X
Finally, the two solutions D, =/3, ._ +/3,,,_, and /_2 =/_,2 -_+/_>.2 ._' can be distinguished as
frontside and backside maneuvers by checking the sign of _ x/}.
The directions of the frontside and backside maneuvers are determined next. As
illustrated in Figure 70, the point of tangency location establishes:
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• and (88)
Solving these equations (88) gives the directions of frontside and backside maneuvers.
Next, the magnitudes of the relative motion vectors are determined. For the non-
cooperative case, the magnitude and direction of the velocity vector of aircraft A is
described by VA = vAY" AS shown in Figure 69 and 70, the model for the heading
maneuver of aircraft B allows the velocity vector _a to be located on a circle described by:
2 2 (89)cx 4- (c._,4- vA)2 = vB
where the relative motion is _ = Cx_C+ Cy_,, the speed of aircraft A is v A , and the speed of
aircraft B is v B. Given the direction of a maneuver to be _ = c_ =c_xJ+c_,._,,
equation (89) becomes:
2
(C_x)2 + (c_; + vA)2 = vB" (90)
Equation (90) establishes the following relationship for the unknown c:
c 2 + (2t3yvA)c 4. (vA2 - v2) = 0 (91)
which can be solved using the quadratic equation:
C __vV a 4. 4y2 ," 2= . - -c_,v A • (92)
Two solutions c I and c2 result. However, equation (92) applies to both frontside and
backside maneuvers, so a total of four candidate solutions exist, as illustrated in Figure 71.
For frontside maneuvers, the two solutions ?l+ = cl_ + and _-_ = c2 _+ are determined by
equation (92) using _'+ ^÷ ^ ^+^= c xx+cyy, and for backside maneuvers, there are the two
solutions _ = cl_- and ?2 = c2c- determined by equation (92) using _- = _._+ _y_,.
Given the four candidate solutions ?l+, ?_-, ?_-, or ?_-, the candidate solution that is closest
to the current relative motion _ is the best maneuver since it requires the smallest heading
change. The required heading change is computed using the candidate maneuver velocity:
Frontside: -÷ = ?+YB -- VA or Backside: VB : C -- V a (93)
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for theanglebetweenthevelocityvector _s (beforethemaneuver)and the new velocity
vector(afterthemaneuver):
Frontside:AU?B = cos -1(_ •vB) or Backside: AW B = cos -z(f_ • "_B). (94)
However, limitations for candidate maneuvers occur when the quadratic equation (91 ) has
complex roots; these limitations will be investigated later.
B (x,y) _ vB
_---"_c_ Frontside Maneuver
Backside Maneuver _[c_\\\
/ "VA] v__C"/ FrontsideManeuver
{ _.._c Current Relative Motion
Fe_asi_le Maneuv - v_ 7 c/ Backside Maneuver
• aeuvers: /
Locus of all_/,/
Figure 71. The four frontside and backside non-cooperative maneuvers.
For cooperative cases, the magnitudes of the relative motion vectors are similarly
derived. In the cooperative case, the velocity vector for aircraft A can be changed to have
components _a = VA_-_ + VA, ._, in contrast to the non-cooperative case where vA = VAY" The
model for the heading maneuver of aircraft B relative to aircraft A allows the velocity vector
_8 to be located on a circle described by the equation:
2 2 2(C,,+VA, +(C, 4-VAy ) =V B (95)
where the relative motion is ? = CxYC+ Cy_, and the speed of aircraft B is v s. Given the
direction of a maneuver to be ? = cg = C_xYC+ C_y_, equation (95) becomes:
(CC_ 4- _'aj -/" (c? + vA, )2 = vb. (96)
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This equation(96)establishesthefollowing equationfor theunknownc:
c 2 + (2_xVa, + 2CyVAy)C 4- (V2A -- V_) = 0 (97)
which can be solved using the quadratic equation, provided that the components of the
velocity vector VA = VAt'f "t-VArY are known. Since these components for the velocity
vector of aircraft A are unspecified at this time (to be determined by further economics
analysis), there are an infinite number of candidate solutions for the magnitude c. In
comparison, the non-cooperative case results in four candidate solutions.
In both non-cooperative and cooperative cases, there are limitations on heading
maneuvers in both the magnitude and direction of the maneuver. The basic geometry of a
heading maneuver is determined by the relative motion c = v B- _A, as shown in Figures
68 and 69. In general, this relative motion vector has the following magnitude lower and
upper bounds:
I 1= I B--  I  I+I AI • (98)
Consider three cases based on speed ratio 7' = VB/VA. When 7'> 1 or 7'< 1, there is a finite
lower bounds for the magnitude of _', but when 7,= 1, it is possible to have a zero relative
motion vector, ? =0, and at or near this condition the conflict resolution maneuver may take
an impractical amount of time. As for the direction of _', illustrated in Figure 72 and 73,
cooperative scenarios have no direction limitations for ?, but for non-cooperative
scenarios, there are limitations on the magnitude and direction of _" when 7, < 1. This is
bounded by two concentric circles, as shown in Figure 73. The magnitude of the ? vector
is represented by the distance from the base point (o) to the points on the outer limit circle.
When 7,= 1, the inner circle vanishes, otherwise, for 7, > 1 or 7/< 1, the lower bounds on
the magnitude of ? creates the inner limit circle. The angle the ? vector makes with the y-
axis of the aircraft A moving axis system defines a relative maneuver angle /3c for _'. For
_,> 1, there are no limitations on the direction of ?. For 7,< 1 in the non-cooperative case,
the _ vector becomes more and more constrained in direction as the speed ratio 7'
decreases; _ is limited in direction by the angles ]3C < -tr + sin -I 7' and ,6c > ¢r - sin-' 7' .
When 7,< 1 and aircraft A is non-cooperative, aircraft B is flying slow in compared to the
faster but non-cooperative aircraft A. If _ is directed at the Protected Airspace Zone, this
situation represents an extremely dangerous non-cooperative situation; aircraft B may not
be able to avoid a conflict no matter how much maneuvering is performed. This analysis of
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thelimitationsof themagnitudeanddirectionof themaneuvervector F indicates that there
may be some cases where one or both of the front and backside maneuvers are
unachievable.
^
tYB ,, Limit Case ^ Limit Case
, Ys Backside _ Ys Frontside
R_N Maneuver _ Maneuver
-vA i \\
! (cx ,c,.)
Figure 72. Three cases for non-cooperative strategic heading maneuvers; the
geometry limits the magnitude and direction of the relative motion F
maneuver vectors depending on the speed ratio y.
Figure 73.
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The geometry of the relative motion F for cooperative strategic heading
maneuvers defines a locus of all maneuver vectors in the form of two
concentric circles.
Maneuver charts for optimal strategic heading control maneuvers may be formed by
computing the optimal heading maneuver trajectories for arbitrary initial conditions.
Example maneuver chart results are shown in Figure 74 through 76. As previously
discussed, the frontside or backside maneuvers are applicable in a limited region, a band
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around the pure collision relativemotion line; outsidethis band, there is no maneuver
necessary.However, a purecollision line is not alwaystheseparator(dispersalsurface)
betweenfrontside and backsidemaneuvers. When constructingthe maneuverchart,
considerationsmustbemadefor thedirectionlimitationsof therelativemotionvector for
frontsideandbacksidemaneuvers,aspreviouslydiscussed.If the speedratioconditionis
CaseI, y> 1, then there are no limitations on the direction for a heading maneuver, and the
dispersal surface is the pure collision line, as shown in Figure 74. If the speed ratio
condition is Case II, y =1, then the relative motion heading is limited by the relative
/17 /17
maneuver angle tic < --- or tic > --. Consequently, there are regions where only a
2 2
backside maneuver can be performed, as shown in Figure 75. If the speed ratio condition
is Case III, y <1, then the relative motion heading is even more limited by the relative
maneuver angles tic <-n'+sin-lY and on the other side by tic >Tr-sin-lY •
Consequently, there are regions where only backside maneuvers can be performed, and a
region where neither a frontside nor a backside maneuver may successfully accomplish a
strategic maneuver (note that the assumptions for a strategic maneuver greatly deteriorate
here as well). Figure 76 shows a maneuver chart result for Case III.
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A non-cooperative strategic heading maneuver chart for a speed ratio 7>1.
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Figure 75. A non-cooperative strategic heading maneuver chart for a speed ratio 7 =1.
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Figure 76. A non-cooperative strategic heading maneuver chart for a speed ratio 7<1.
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Since the optimal paths contain a saturated constraint portion, they may be difficult
for a pilot to accurately follow. For easier implementation, a turning point approximation
or offset approximation [DAC95] for the optimal trajectory simplifies the heading maneuver
to be a series of vector heading changes, as shown in Figure 77. In this way, standard
ATC vectoring commands can be given at each turning point. For our analysis, the turning
point is defined by the intersection between the tangency line connecting the initial location
of aircraft B to the Protected Airspace Zone constraint circle and the zero range rate line
corresponding to the original course, as shown in Figure 77(a); and the offset maneuver is
tangent to the Protected Airspace Zone constraint circle and parallel to the original track, as
shown in Figure 77(b). While the turning point approximation has one fewer turn
command, the offset approximation limits the lateral deviation for conflict resolution. To
minimize the communications needed for conflict resolution, the turning point
approximation can be applied with an initial turn and a return to the next way point
occurring at the zero range rate point. In this way, only two commands are given, reducing
the amount of communications to two transactions.
Zero Range Rate
B Line for Original Track
Initial "_ _. | / , Protected
Maneuver\ _ A t/ Airspace
R__ Zone
Turning Point ----__ _ Final
Maneuver / '_ _-._aneuver
Zero Range Rate
Line for Original TrackB \\ •.....,vA/
Initial \f _,_ | _ Protected
Maneuve_ _ A_" Airspace
Offse,
Turning Point _/'_- _ Final
Maneuvers _-_P' _.__ aneeuver
Figure 77. Two strategic heading maneuver approximations: (a) a turning point
approximation, and (b) an offset approximation.
The final consideration in designing maneuver charts that are acceptable for air
traffic controllers and pilots is to consider navigation methods and aids. Today, an air
traffic controller typically advises an aircraft to vector in angles that are multiples of 10°.
Perhaps in the future multiples of 2 ° or 5° may be more typical as more accurate navigation
equipment is onboard aircraft and more precise surveillance is available for air traffic
controllers. The optimal maneuver charts presented so far would advise arbitrary heading
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changes,for instance3.7°, 5.2°, or 8.7°. However,thesetypesof headingadvisoriesmay
bedifficult to follow by pilotswithoutadvancednavigationequipment. Instead,maneuver
chartscanbecreatedto allow for headingchangesthat areonly multiplesof a standard
headingchangeof 2°, 5°, or l0°. Thesemorepracticalmaneuverchartscanbebasedon the
optimalprecisemaneuverchartswith theoptimalheadingmaneuverangleroundedup to
thenearest2°, 5°, or l0 °.
5.2 Strategic Speed Control Maneuvers
Strategic speed control maneuvers are investigated with the following assumptions. The
aircraft speed profile for a strategic maneuver is illustrated in Figure 78. The aircraft
accelerates or decelerates to an upper or lower speed limit. The speed limit is established
such that the aircraft will arrive at the Point of Closest Approach PCA exactly at the
minimum separation standard. Furthermore, a symmetric maneuver is executed such that
the aircraft remains at the minimum or maximum speed until accelerating or decelerating
back to the original speed. The original speed is reached at a symmetric point opposite
from the initial speed maneuver point, as shown in Figure 78. Both frontside and backside
maneuvers are considered for the strategic analysis.
Aircraft
Speed _'0
vm,,
-_Deceleration
Lower Speed Limit
PCA and Point of
Symmetry
a_Acceleration
CA d
j. Time
;0 :d 'PCAd "
Time of Time to Time to Time to Time to
Speed Lower PCA using to accelerate Return to
Maneuver Speed Deceleration original speed
Initiation Limit
Figure 78. The symmetric speed profile used for the strategic analysis.
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5.3 Strategic Altitude Control Maneuvers
Strategic altitude maneuvers are investigated with the following assumptions. The aircraft
vertical profile for a strategic maneuver is illustrated in Figure 79. It is assumed that both
aircraft are initially flying at the same altitude, both aircraft are flying steady level flight
paths, and both aircraft have a relative geometry such that a pure collision would occur if
no conflict resolution maneuver were performed. The geometry analysis of tactical altitude
maneuvers from Chapter 4 is also used for this strategic analysis; the only difference is that
maximum and minimum climb and descent rates are not used for strategic maneuvers,
rather, the climb and descent rates are determined such that the aircraft B sufficiently climbs
or descends from the initial condition point to clear the Protected Airspace Zone, as shown
in Figure 79. Furthermore, a symmetric maneuver is executed such that the aircraft B
returns to the original altitude at a distance d from aircraft A, which corresponds to the
distance that aircraft B was from aircraft A when the maneuver was initiated. Since we
consider only aircraft that are initially at the same altitude, there is no initial benefit to being
closer to the topside or the bottomside of the other aircraft.
I Point
[ Iof Symmetry I
[ Topside [ I
Aircraft B Bottomside Aircraft A [ Protected
[ Airspace
Zone[
Figure 79. The symmetric speed profile used for the strategic analysis.
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5.4 Economics Analysis
Next, we examine the economics of strategic maneuvers. The non-cooperative maneuver
puts all of the additional cost on the own aircraft, and the economics analysis is used to
determine when (or at what cost) to start the strategic maneuver. The cooperative maneuver
lets both aircraft share the responsibility for conflict avoidance, so in this case the
economics analysis determines when to start the strategic maneuver as well as how to
evenly split the maneuver effort. One could argue that even is when each aircraft executes
the same heading (speed or altitude) change or when each aircraft incurs the same fuel cost
to resolve the conflict. From the standpoint of the global economics of fleets of aircraft, the
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maneuver can be divided such that the total cost to both aircraft is minimized; however, this
might force the more efficient aircraft to take on most of the effort. A fair way of
maneuvering the aircraft can not be determined without considering the cost that each
aircraft incurs for each maneuver. Also, alternative maneuvers using heading, speed, and
altitude control must be compared based on economical considerations to determine the best
strategic solution. Next, a model for estimating the cost of the maneuver is established.
One of the primary cost factors for aircraft is the Direct Operating Cost (DOC)
penalty incurred by executing conflict resolution maneuvers. The DOC penalty function
used in this research effort incorporates both fuel and time elements. Included in the DOC
are 1) the additional fuel required due to the increased drag and flight path distance traveled
during a maneuver and 2) the additional (non-fuel) operating costs due to the additional
time required to execute the maneuver and retum back to course:
DOC = C/u,tAW:u,t + C,,m,AT (99)
where Ci,,z is the cost of fuel, AWI_,t is the additional fuel used in the maneuver, Crime is
the time dependent aircraft operating cost, and AT is the additional time used in the
maneuver. The DOC terms Cr, e_ and C,,me are investigated by [CD95], for example
Cru,_=$0.10/lb and C,me= $15.22/min. A maneuver is modeled by flight segment
components such as turn segments, climb segments, steady level flight segments, and
acceleration segments. The time and fuel burn for each segment is summed to give a total
time and fuel burn. Finally, the DOC of the maneuver is compared to the DOC for
performing no maneuver at all to determine the additional fuel and time costs. Calculating
the fuel burn for the aircraft is the most difficult part of the analysis and the method used is
outlined below. Another factor which needs to be considered is the additional DOC
incurred by neighboring traffic if it is impacted by conflict resolution maneuvers; however,
we do not model this cost in our current analysis.
A fuel burn estimate is required to properly estimate the cost of maneuvering an
aircraft for conflict resolution. Such an analysis is performed with the Breuget
range/endurance equation [An89]. To start, consider the fuel burn equation:
dW
dt Tec j (100)
where W is the weight, cj is the specific fuel consumption, and TR is the required thrust.
For horizontal or climbing maneuvers the required thrust will be:
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TR = D+Wsin7.,., (101)
where D is the drag and 7,_ is the steady state flight path angle. Aircraft are modeled with
parabolic drag polars and fuel consumptions which vary linearly with airspeed. The lift
coefficient C L is described in terms of the aircraft weight and speed as follows:
CL _ 2Wcosy._,
pV2Sw
(102)
where V is speed, p is air density, and Sw is the reference wing area. The drag is modeled:
1 C -V 2"D=-_ oP '3w (103)
where CD is the drag coefficient, approximated by:
CD = Co,, + KCL 2. (104)
1
Here, CDo is the zero lift drag coefficient, K- is the induced drag factor, e is
zr,eAR
Oswald's efficiency factor, and AR is the wing aspect ratio. Furthermore, the thrust
specific fuel consumption of a turbojet or turbofan engine increases nearly linearly with
mach number [Ra92]. For this reason, the fuel consumption can be modeled as:
cj = o'V (105)
where g is the linear coefficient. Next, these endurance equations can be combined to
obtain the fuel burn equation:
dW
dt
½PV2Sw Coo( 2 W cos )'+ K pV2S,, ' + WsinT.,. , (rV .
J
(106)
Equation (106) is integrated to calculate the fuel bum, given the geometry of the previously
defined turning point heading maneuvers, symmetric altitude maneuvers, or symmetric
speed control maneuvers. For cases of constant altitude and constant climb rate, the
airspeed is constant, allowing equation (106) to be evaluated analytically. For acceleration
cases where the velocity is not constant, the equation must be integrated numerically.
Heading maneuvers, altitude maneuvers, and speed control maneuvers are
compared based on economics. Consider the following example. Two identical generic
turbojet aircraft flying at the same speed are positioned such that a pure collision will result
if no evasive action is taken. The specifications for the aircraft are shown in Table 1. The
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speedof the aircraft is chosenso that thedirect operatingcost DOC is minimized.For
example,Figure 80 shows this speedis 400 kts for a hypotheticalaircraft. At some
specifiedrangefrom thepoint of conflict,oneof theaircraftmaneuversto avoidtheconflict
usinga non-cooperativemaneuver.Figure 81 through 86 illustrateheading,speed,and
altitudecost analysisresultswhenthe scenariogeometryis varied. This analysiscan
identifythecostto maneuver,which in turn, canbeusedto determinewhich maneuverto
useandwhento initiate thenon-cooperativemaneuver.
Table1.Specificationsfor aconflict resolutioninvestigation.
Altitude
Zerolift dragcoefficient, Coo
Induced drag factor, K 2
Fuel efficiency factor, o"
Gross Weight
Wing Area
Cost of fuel
Cost of flight time
34000fi
0.019
0.054
2.08x 10 -3 lb/(lb hr kt)
110000 Ibs
1889ft 2
$0.12//b
$ 913.20/hr
2400
235O
_2300
0
2250
a
2200
2150
300
I i t
320 340 360 380 400 420 440 460 480 500
Airspeed (Ms)
Figure 80. Example aircraft DOC versus airspeed for a 500 nmi cruise.
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Figure 81. Example solution for no maneuver (left) and a non-cooperative heading
maneuver (right) for an initial heading difference 0 = 90 ° and 30 nmi distance
from a pure collision.
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Figure 85. Example solution for no maneuver (left) and a non-cooperative heading
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These results imply several important conclusions. The most obvious conclusion is
that altitude maneuvers are far less costly to perform than either speed or heading
maneuvers. Furthermore, altitude maneuvers appear to be independent of initial aircraft
orientation and the range at which the aircraft start the maneuver. Notice that speed
maneuvers become prohibitively expensive when closer than a range of 30-40 nmi. Also,
as the heading difference 0 increases for the two aircraft, the heading maneuvers become
less expensive and the speed maneuvers become more expensive.
Altitude maneuvers prove to be favorable for a couple of reasons. First, the vertical
separation requirements are less stringent than the horizontal separation requirements, thus
making altitude maneuvers easier to achieve. An aircraft only needs 1000 ft vertical
separation compared to 5 nmi (30380 ft) horizontal separation. If one only considers
clearance distance required by each maneuver, the altitude maneuver is 30 times less
demanding. (As the horizontal separation constraint is reduced with better surveillance, for
instance, from 5 to 3 to 1 nmi, this argument will change.) The second advantage for
altitude maneuvers is that they are largely conservative. The aircraft gains potential energy
while climbing which it, in turn, uses during the descent. Since the climb rate required to
gain 1000 ft over a range of 10 to 50 nmi is very low, the airspeed of the aircraft hardly
changes. The resulting increase in drag is small, making the maneuver almost conservative.
In comparison, the turning aircraft increases its load factor which increases drag
considerably, and consumes energy nonconservatively. Furthermore, the detour that the
turning aircraft makes has no subsequent benefit.
The speed maneuvers are the most costly of all of the maneuvers. Slowing the
aircraft not only wastes time but also operates the aircraft at a speed which is inefficient.
Speeding the aircraft up, while not wasting time, again operates the aircraft at an inefficient
speed. To explain the inefficiency, recall that drag increases with the square of velocity and
the power required for flight increases with the cube of velocity.
Next, the direct operating cost DOC model is used to investigate cooperative
strategic maneuvers. The purpose of the analysis is to determine the best way for two
aircraft to evenly split the strategic maneuver. The key word even is dependent on a
criterion yet to be established; indeed, it is not necessarily the intent of this research to
define even, but rather to discuss the options and illustrate the results. Consider the case
where simple heading vectors are used as is shown in Figure 87. One could argue that
even is when each aircraft executes the same heading change. However, when the same
heading change is executed by two aircraft traveling at different speeds, the faster aircraft
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Figure 87. The flight paths for Aircraft A and B during a cooperative strategic
maneuver; a line connects the trajectories at the Point of Closest
Approach PCA.
will contribute more to the miss distance. Next, even could also be defined when each
aircraft contributes equal amounts of fuel cost in resolving the conflict. Yet another way to
define even would be to choose a maneuver which minimizes each aircraft's conflict
resolution direct operating cost. Note also that the information available to a decision
support algorithm is likely to only include the positions, speeds and headings of both
aircraft. With such limited information, it is difficult to determine the most economic
maneuver when the economics is so dependent on individual aircraft performance. Thus,
any algorithm based on economics will necessarily have to be fairly general. Also, the
method developed should be a suitable economical analysis for virtually any two aircraft.
The purpose of the analysis is to economically compare maneuvers; the purpose is
not to evaluate nor to rank the most economical aircraft. Comparisons of specific aircraft
pairs do not lend themselves to general conclusions. Consider the comparison of a
business jet encountering a large commercial transport. The business jet, generally being
one tenth the weight of the transport, will always burn less fuel regardless of the maneuver.
The subsequent economic analysis suggests that total cost is minimized by always placing
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the total burden of the maneuver on the business jet regardless of the speed of the two
aircraft. Such results do not suit our purpose. To make generalized conclusions, we must
specifically avoid results which are biased by aircraft performance.
The problem with comparing the operating costs for cooperative maneuvers is that
the more efficient aircraft typically bears more of the burden of maneuvering. To avoid an
unfair bias towards issuing larger heading changes to the more efficient aircraft, a special
effort must be taken to artificially set both aircraft to be equally efficient. Under these
conditions, we then split the effort equally. If they are not equally efficient in reality,
which is most likely the case, then the less efficient aircraft ends up incurring a greater cost.
To develop a general result, some economic equivalence must be imposed.
Therefore, the following rule is applied to both aircraft models in the analysis: the DOC in
terms of $/nmi will be assumed identical for all aircraft regardless of speed. The operating
cost could also have be determined in terms of $/hr, since maintenance schedules are often
determined by hours of operation. This definition stems from the standard metric of
cost/seat/mile, commonly used by the airlines.
To achieve the economic equivalency, five constraints are imposed on the two
aircraft models which are used in the analysis: 1) establish the same drag polar with
K a = K 8, 2)establish the same initial lift coefficient CLA = CL, to insure equal
aerodynamic efficiency, 3) use the same specific fuel consumptions a A = cry, 4) establish
the same weight WA = WB, and 5) establish crew times proportional to aircraft speeds:
Ctime B V B
- (107)
Crime A V A
Both aircraft must be fixed to have identical drag polars so that they have the same drag
coefficient at a given lift coefficient. To insure equal lift to drag//D ratios, both aircraft
must also be fixed to have the same lift coefficient. This requires CD,,, = CD,,B, and for
aircraft at different speeds, the reference area, S,, for each aircraft must be adjusted so that
the lift coefficients are the same:
_ 2_
CLA - V WA -CLe V_ sothat S.. =S,,, VA" (108)
P A-S..A P B'S_,_ . VB2"
To insure that the fuel consumption yields equivalent fuel burns for both aircraft, the fuel
consumptions are scaled as follows: C/, = aVA and cj, = aV e, where o" is the fuel
efficiency factor of the generic aircraft as indicated in Table 1.
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Using this analysis, two economically equivalent aircraft are investigated to
establish the cooperative maneuver. Consider the case where aircraft B is flying at 300 kts
and aircraft A is flying at 400 kts, where these are the ideal operating speeds for each
aircraft, as shown in Figure 88. Notice both aircraft are fixed to have the same unit cost
per nmi even though they have different operating speeds. Figure 89 shows the required
heading changes and DOC for both aircraft plotted as a function of the percentage of the
final miss distance that aircraft A contributes (B contributes the difference). The cost of the
maneuver is shared equally where the DOC lines for each aircraft cross. Note that this is
not necessarily where both aircraft execute the same heading change. Furthermore, the
point where the overall DOC is minimized is where aircraft A bears 68% of the burden for
the tum (marked *). This plot indicates that it is more economical to let the faster aircraft
bear more of the maneuvering burden. For two aircraft with equal speeds, plots indicate
that backside maneuvers are generally less costly than frontside maneuvers. The backside
maneuver is generally more efficient because the relative velocity, _, is faster with
backside maneuvers; the point of closest approach is then reached sooner than when the
frontside maneuver is used.
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Figure 88. A cost curve comparison between two different aircraft,
Aircraft A and Aircraft B, over a 500 nmi distance.
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5.5 Benefits of Reduced Separations Standards
Next, the benefits of reduced separation standards can be investigated by
performing this analysis for cases where the Protected Airspace Zone PAZ radius is
reduced from 5 to 3 or 1 nmi - feasible due to more accurate navigation information, such
as provided by GPS. Figures 90 through 92 illustrate the economics of reducing the
separation requirements. The results indicate that a reduction in the horizontal separation
standard from 5 to 3 nmi can reduce the cost of a maneuver by roughly 3 times. Reducing
the horizontal separation standard from 5 to 1 nmi can reduce the cost of a maneuver by
roughly 10 times. No significant change occurs in the cost of altitude maneuvers, which
are relatively inexpensive for all cases.
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Figure 90. The cost of non-cooperative heading maneuvers where aircraft B flies to
the frontside or backside of aircraft A; trends show the economic
advantage of reducing the horizontal separation requirement from 5 to 3
or 1 nmi (heading difference of 0 = 90°).
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Figure 92. The cost of non-cooperative altitude control maneuvers where aircraft B slows
climbs up 1000 ft with respect to aircraft A; trends show little difference in
reducing the horizontal separation requirement from 5 to 3 or 1 nmi (heading
difference of 0 = 90°).
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5.6 Combined Tactical and Strategic Maneuver Charts
Finally, transitioning from no maneuver to strategic cases and between strategic and
tactical cases needs further analysis. While the desire to minimize the economic penalty
leads to a more gradual maneuver at a longer initial range, a tradeoff exists due to the
greater uncertainty in predicting the separation at closest approach. When vary far away,
no maneuver should be performed until the probability of false alarm is sufficiently
reduced, as shown in Figure 93. Deciding when the strategic situation becomes a tactical
situation will require human factors research, which is not discussed here. This transition
may be triggered by some warning time-to-go to the Tactical Alert Zone, essentially the last
chance to maneuver. Examples of such time-to-go warnings were covered in Chapter 3.
Low Probability
of Conflict
Strategic
Alert
Zone
Alert
Zone
Protected
Airspace
Zone
"_ Hold
_ Heading.
Clear (Pos. Range Rate)
Figure 93. Regions around the Protected Airspace Zone help to define when no
maneuver is performed due to a low probability of conflict, when the
strategic maneuver is used, and when the tactical maneuver is used.
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6. SYSTEM MECHANIZATION ISSUES
In this chapter, mechanization issues associated with fielding an effective conflict detection
and resolution system are discussed. First, the various system elements, or components,
are identified. Then, we discuss the mechanization of the conflict detection logic including
the effects of measurement error on probabilities of false alarm, missed alarm, and incorrect
maneuver selection. Next, the coordination of maneuvers via data exchange between two
cooperative aircraft is discussed, including communication requirements. Displays and
human factors issues are described next, and finally, the uses of simulations and flight tests
to evaluate a prototype system are summarized.
6.1 Mechanization Elements
Figure 94 is a block diagram that depicts the elements, or components, that make up or
affect a conflict detection and resolution system within the context of an aircraft system.
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Figure 94. Mechanization elements of a traffic conflict detection and resolution system.
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Includedin thissystemblockdiagramarethefollowing:
1) Own Aircraft Dynamics. This is the controllable "plant" that is being maneuvered to
avoid the conflict. The plant is modeled with point mass dynamics, as presented
earlier in this report.
2) Navigation Sensors. This includes GPS complemented possibly by baro-altimeter,
INS, WAAS, or LAAS signals. An air data computer may also be used to derive true
airspeed. These sensors are used to compute the current position and velocity (state)
of the own aircraft.
3) Conflict Detection and Resolution Avionics. This is the collection of avionics that
implement the conflict detection and resolution algorithms. Included are the
following components:
a.
b.
c.
d,
e°
f.
Conflict Aircraft Tracker based on received state and intent messages,
either directly from the other aircraft or from ground ATM sources;
Trajectory Prediction of aircraft based on state and intent data for the
own and other aircraft;
Conflict Detection based on relative range, range rate, speed, altitude,
point of closest approach PCA, time-to-PCA, and conflict probability;
Conflict Resolution consisting of the maneuver and timing selection
logic to resolve conflicts;
Maneuver Commands consisting of the collaboration logic needed to
execute the maneuver and coordinate motion with associated maneuvers
of other aircraft; and
Maneuver Monitor consisting of the logic that insures that conflicts are
being resolved as planned. Vernier control commands may be required
to remove trajectory errors.
4) Pilot Interface Driver. This function computes the visual information that can be
projected onto a 2D plan view, 2D profile view, or 3D perspective view display and
aural alarms to alert the pilot of conflict situations. It includes the logic for icon shape,
orientation, placement, color, color changes, projection vectors, etc. as determined by
human factors studies to create an effective situational awareness display. Textual
messages may also be displayed. Information communicated to the pilot also includes
the command information that suggests how to respond to a detected conflict - which
maneuver to make, when to begin and end segments of the maneuver, how other
aircraft in the conflict are responding, and how to return to the flight plan after the
conflict has been resolved.
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5)
6)
7)
8)
Displays and Alerts. This includes a 2D plan view or 3D perspective view display
and aural alarms to alert the pilot of conflict situations. Also included is pilot interface
mechanisms for selecting maneuver options, setting map range scale, and adjusting
the flight plans for conflict resolution follow-up. In a sense, the displays work as a
flight director.
Database. The database contains the various data needed for an effective conflict
detection and resolution system. These data include:
a°
b.
C.
d°
e.
f°
Flight Plan Data used to determine the own aircraft intent;
Tracked Trajectory Data and known intent data maintained for other
aircraft which may pose conflict threats;
Wind Field Data assisting in trajectory prediction for own and other
aircraft; this is used for conflict detection assessment and strategic
resolution maneuvers;
Airspace Constraint Data identifying Special Use Airspace (SUA),
convective weather, or other airspace which the own aircraft should
avoid;
Terrain Data used for aircraft-terrain conflicts and for modeling the
terrain if this is included as part of a display; and
Data Link Message Data from other aircraft, ATM, and AOC,
coordinated and prioritized for conflict detection, forming the basis of
communication and coordination data for conflict resolution.
Data Link Messaging. This component forms or processes data messages to be sent
to and received from other aircraft, the AOC dispatcher, and ATM. Outgoing
messages include own aircraft state (position, velocity, aircraft identification, aircraft
type) and intent, conflict detection status, conflict resolution maneuver intent and
status, flight plan changes, and other information such as weather measurements
useful to the AOC dispatcher and ATM for forming wind field data. Incoming
messages include other aircraft state and intent data, conflict detection and resolution
messages (which could come from ATM or other aircraft), and updated wind field
data.
Data Link Router Broadcast. This device transmits and receives data link messages to
suitable onboard and/or external information consumers. External information
consumers include other aircraft, ATM, and AOC dispatchers.
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9) Pilot. With respect to conflict detection and resolution, the pilot typically flies the
aircraft in response to maneuvers suggested by the conflict detection and resolution
system. However, the pilot retains override command of the aircraft.
10) Controls. This includes the usual throttle, elevator, aileron, and rudder controls for
affecting heading, speed, or altitude maneuvers.
ll) Other Aircraft. Other aircraft have their own dynamics, data link, and avionics logic,
perhaps with different equipment from the own aircraft. These must be appropriately
modeled to the same fidelity as the own aircraft system model (Items 1-10) when
evaluating the effectiveness of the conflict detection and resolution logic and
designing pilot interfaces.
12) Winds. The wind field has an effect on the aircraft trajectory, particularly on the
relative velocity vector and how it directs an aircraft to travel to the point of closest
approach PCA. The further apart the two aircraft are at the initial point of the detected
conflict, the greater is the uncertainty in the wind field between them, affecting the
time-to-PCA.
Models are required of each of these components when analyzing or simulating a conflict
detection and resolution system. Analyses and fast-time simulations are required for
establishing various system parameters (e.g., nominal "acceptable miss distance" taking
into account trajectory uncertainties, time-to-PCA to begin strategic maneuvers, etc.), for
determining the sensitivity of the system performance to errors so that standards can be
established, for validating the reliability of the software logic for every point in the potential
operating envelope, and as a prelude to real-time simulations for establishing pilot interface
requirements.
6.2 System Sources of Errors and Uncertainties
With respect to the exchange of data, communications, computation of conflict detection
and resolution algorithms, etc., the effects of modeling errors and uncertainties in the real
world play an important role in mechanization. The navigation sensor, pilot, controls,
aircraft dynamics, and wind components shown in Figure 94 are sources of errors or
variations from nominal performance that affect the aircraft trajectories. For example,
variations in wind field model, longitudinal speed, climb rate, turn rate, navigation
accuracy, and pilot delay from the ideal model used to compute trajectories, point of closest
approach PCA, conflict probability, and resolution maneuvers are all important. The actual
117
maneuversandmissdistanceat PCA will beperturbedfrom thetrajectorypredictionlogic
solutionbecauseof theseerrors.
A significantpart of the conflict detectionlogic developmentmust deal with
measurementand trajectoryprediction uncertainty. For the case of air-to-air conflict
detectionandresolutionfor FreeFlight, it maybeassumedthatboth aircraftareequipped
with GPSreceiversthatarecorrectedwith WAAS or LAAS differential corrections,and
ADS-B to exchangeposition, velocity, aircraft identification,aircraft type, and intent
informationdirectlybetweenaircraft.Thus, therelativepositionerrorsareexpectedto be
lessthan10meters.Thevelocitiesmaybe in erroron theorderof 2 kts in magnitudeand
1°in direction. Miss distancesandPCA locations/timespredictedfrom sucha navigation
sensorwill haveuncertainty,themagnitudeof which is dependentupon the initial range
betweentheconflictingaircraftandthemeasurementuncertaintyproperties,asdiscussedin
Chapter3. Furthermore,while it is important to have confidencein the predicted
positions,thereareat leasttwo reasonswhy thepredictiontimeshouldbe limited, evenif
perfectnavigationfixeswereavailable. First, anaircraftmaynot hold a constantvelocity
vector.Second,a longprediction time implies a long resolution time, and this increases the
probability of multiple strategic encounters, overlapping in time -- a so-called "domino
effect", which is to be avoided. To mitigate these long term prediction problems, the Free
Flight domain may need a stable planning horizon enforced by the broadcast of aircraft
intent data. How strategic conflict resolution affects planning stability is an area in need of
further investigation.
Another type of error is in the execution of the trajectories relative to those directed
by the conflict resolution logic. This refers to the action of the pilot (or autopilot) to steer
the aircraft along the presented normal flight plan or a conflict avoidance maneuver path
indicated on the display. Actuation error is the difference between the aircraft state, as
measured by the navigation sensor and presented to the pilot, and the desired state as
dictated by the flight plan or conflict resolution maneuver plan. For example, pilots
initiating conflict resolution maneuvers will have timing errors. Pilots and even autopilots
will not keep the aircraft on perfect lines in space; there will be position and velocity errors.
These will all affect the actual miss distance and time-to-PCA.
A third type of error is due to the wind uncertainty along both aircraft paths leading
to the PCA between the two aircraft. This has a negligible effect on tactical maneuvers
because of the relative short ranges involved; both aircraft essentially experience the same
wind conditions. However, as the distance between the aircraft increases, as is the case in
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strategicmaneuvers,thewinds thatboth aircraftareexperiencingmaybevastly different.
A simpleconstantvelocitywind modelmaynotbeappropriate.
The effectsof thesevariousmeasurementand trajectorypredictionerrors canbe
analyzedusing both statisticalcovarianceanalysisandMonteCarlosimulationtechniques
(seeChapter3). Both techniquesarebasedupon usingthemodelof theperfect,error free
maneuverasthebaseline. Theoutcomesof statisticalanalysescan include: (a) a set of
statisticalperformancemetricsof goodnessof theconflict detectionandresolutionsystem;
and(b)asetof sensitivityfactorsthatdeterminethequantitativerelationshipof themetrics
to themagnitudesof thevariouserrorandsystemparameters.
Performancemetricsareusedto determineif a conflict detectionand resolution
schememeetsestablishedstandardsfor safety,reliability, andefficiency. The sensitivities
canbe usedto specifyperformancerequirementsof systemcomponentsandthe standard
settingsfor systemparameters- how goodthe statemeasurementshaveto be, wherethe
maneuversshouldbe started,and what constitutesan adequatesafe miss distance.To
addressthesemetrics, threedifferent measuresof miss distancein the horizontaland
verticaldimensionsneedto be defined. First, aspreviously definedin Chapter 3, the
horizontal miss distance is rz and the Protected Airspace Zone radius is R. Define a
collision distance parameter rc<<R as:
r c = 0.5(b A + b s ) (109)
where b,_ and b B are defined to be the wing spans for aircraft A and aircraft B. By
definition, a collision occurs if r: _<r c. Next, define a near miss distance parameter rNM
(rc<rNu) as a threshold value close to the separation requirement R:
rNM=kR. (110)
By definition, a near miss occurs if r c < r/_< rNu. The constant k is defined less than or
equal to 1. If the constant k is less than 1, for example k=O. 75, then this may allow the
average conflict resolution miss distance to be at or near the separation standard R, as
shown in Figure 95. If the constant k were to be defined greater than 1, then the mean
miss distance is likely to be far outside the separation standard, which might be overly
conservative and add an economic penalty to the average conflict resolution maneuver.
Finally, define an acceptable miss distance parameter r_ (rNM< r_) to be, for example,
50% over the separation standard:
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rAM= I.5R. (111)
By definition, an acceptable miss occurs if rNM < r: __ rAM, and an excessive miss occurs if
the conflict detection and resolution logic commands a maneuver such that rr >rAM. Miss
distance outcome probabilities include the probability of a collision, near miss, acceptable
miss, or excessive miss, as shown in Figure 95. Three similar vertical distance
parameters, h c, hNM, and hAM, can be defined for separation requirements in the vertical
dimension.
Miss Distance following
Optimal Maneuver Chart
.... _ Miss Distance
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Figure 95. The statistical distribution of horizontal miss distance which
defines collision, near miss, acceptable miss, and excessive miss
(drawing not to scale).
The values of these six miss distance parameters need to be established for practical
future conflict detection and resolution scenarios. A statistical analysis must be performed
by using a model including the elements in Figure 94 and separation standards of safety
that are acceptable to the aviation community. Unlike the analysis performed in Chapter 3
for miss distance variation given no maneuver, the investigation for these parameters must
include many more factors, including the fact that the pilot or autopilot is executing a
conflict resolution maneuver, may be performing a sub-optimal maneuver, or may be
executing a wrong maneuver. In the future, aircraft will employ Required Navigation
Performance (RNP) equipment standards with higher accuracies and Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) methods; these factors must also be taken into
consideration. For example, we may need to determine the RNP that will guarantee that an
acceptable miss distance of at least 1.5 nmi can be met 99.997% of the time for a typical
crossing encounter between two turbojets.
The performance metrics that should be investigated include the conflict detection
probabilities of false alarms, missed alarms, and incorrect maneuvers. A false alarm is an
erroneous conflict detected even though adequate miss distance (as determined by the PCA)
would be achieved without a maneuver. False alarms are annoyances to pilots, cause extra
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workload, may cause pilots to disregard actual conflict warnings, and could add additional
flight cost since they may cause the pilot to maneuver the aircraft when no maneuver is
needed. A missed alarm has an actual conflict present, but because of measurement error
or an unknown or unexpected maneuver, a safe PCA is projected. This could cause the
conflict resolution maneuver initiation to be delayed so that an economic or safety penalty is
incurred. That is, the maneuver could be more severe than if started earlier causing less
efficient flight, or the range at PCA could be smaller than the value that has been
established to represent adequate safety (acceptable miss distance). Finally, an incorrect
maneuver occurs when an actual conflict is present and detected, but because of
measurement error or unexpected maneuvering, the conflict resolution maneuver is
incorrect (e.g., in the wrong direction). This could cause either an economic or safety
penalty.
During a strategic encounter, there is also a need to monitor the situation between
aircraft in order to collect the appropriate data for conflict detection and resolution. As the
aircraft fly closer together, the errors in the relative state, the relative trajectory's forward
projection to the PCA, and the projected miss distance become smaller because (a) more
measurements have been processed, and (b) less time-to-PCA is available for the wind field
and actuation errors to propagate. Thus, one strategy favors continuing to take data while
allowing the aircraft to get closer so as to be more certain that a maneuver is necessary (i.e.,
the probability of conflict continues to grow). However, if a maneuver is necessary,
waiting increases the magnitude of the maneuver required thereby increasing the cost of the
maneuver. The other strategy favors maneuvering as soon as a potential conflict is detected
to minimize the amount (and cost) of the maneuver required. However, generally the PCA
uncertainty is very large at long range, so maneuvering early would cause a high false
alarm rate. This problem lends itself to a solution where the two strategies (wait and take
more data to potentially become more certain; and maneuver soon to reduce maneuver cost)
are blended. The logic would compute and monitor: 1) the time history of probability of
conflict (as in Chapter 3); and 2) the maneuver cost as a function of time-to-go to PCA (as
in Chapter 5). These two functions can be combined using, for instance, fuzzy logic, and if
their combination exceeds a preset threshold, then a maneuver would be activated. Fuzzy
logic would also allow aircraft to include other conditions for initiating a maneuver.
6.3 Mechanization of Conflict Detection Logic
As previously discussed in this report, probability maps, Strategic and Tactical Alert
Zones, and maneuver charts provide the means for summarizing the conflict detection and
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resolutionlogic. While thesesummarizemanyinitial conditions,only the particularinitial
condition relevantto the two aircraft in a conflict areappropriatein the mechanization.
Only theequationsandlogicrelevantto handlea conflict situationneedto be implemented
onboardin real-time. Furthermore,once the conflict resolutionlogic is determined,the
coordinationandcommunicationof dataneedto be established. Theseissueswere not
discussedin thealgorithmicdevelopmentin previouschapters.
Forthe2-aircraftencounter,whereit is assumedthatbothaircraftareequippedfor
conflict detectionandresolution,a "Master-Slave"coordinationmay beestablished. One
aircraftA (the"Master")plansandcommandsthemaneuversandtheotheraircraftB (the
"Slave")concurswith theplanand executesthe maneuverdelegatedto it. Variousrules
needto besetinto logic to determinewhichaircraftis "Master",andif this role would ever
changeor be over-ridden.We can refer to this logic as "Rules-of-the-Road"regarding
conflict detectionandresolutionmanagement.Forexample,FreeFlight policy mightadapt
therulesusedat seawherebythestarboardvesselhasright of way. Or we mightadaptthe
hemispheralaltituderule, for example,such that the more westboundaircraft has the
"Master' role. This establishmentof "Rules-of-the-Road"requires further study to
determinethebestpolicy.
Theaircrafthavelimitedmaneuverchoices-tum right (R)or left (L), climb up (U)
or descend (D), accelerate (Ac) or decelerate (Dc) - followed by a period of holding the
velocity vector constant until PCA. Thus, the cooperative turn combinations to be examined
are simply RR, RL, LR, or LL; climb/descend options are UD or DU; acceleration
combinations are AcDc or DcAc. The logic which tries each of these maneuver
combinations, as appropriate, for any encounter initial conditions is easily implementable in
software. The dynamic part of the maneuver is stopped when the result of continuing along
a straight line path yields greater than the required miss distance with sufficient probability.
The software logic would compute the relative trajectories from each combination,
determine if an acceptable solution exists for that combination, and compute the cost of that
solution. The minimum cost solution would be chosen to be displayed to the pilots.
However, sub-optimal solutions should be retained for contingencies.
One contingency would be needed when the conflict resolution maneuver puts both
aircraft into a deadlock condition. For example, a deadlock would exist if A turns right, B
turns left, and both end up going along parallel paths, side by side and away from their
intended courses. In this case, the second best maneuver pair could be chosen instead to
avoid the deadlock. Note that if an altitude maneuver or a maneuver combining heading
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and altitudewere usedfor conflict resolution, then both aircraftcould proceedwith any
horizontal return to track maneuverwithout a deadlock, since the vertical separation
requirementwouldbesatisfiedduringtherecoverymaneuver.
A secondcontingencywould be neededwhen a 2-aircraft conflict resolution
maneuveris constrainedby athirdaircraftC. Here,onepossibleoutcomeis thataircraft A
andB haveasecondmaneuverchoicethatdoesnot conflictwith C. Anotherpossibilityis
that the algorithm determinea conflict resolution strategyusing an optimal 3-aircraft
maneuver.This will requiremorestudythanwhathasbeeninvestigatedin this report to
determineall theconflict avoidancemaneuverchoicesavailableandhow to establishwhich
aircraftis "Master".Forthemultipleaircraft(threeor more)encounters,revertingcontrolto
theground-basedATM systemmightbethebestchoice.
A thirdcontingencywouldbeneededwhentherearemaneuveringconstraintssuch
as airspacerestrictions,terrain, or weatherthat eliminatecertainmaneuveroptions. For
example,climb/descendto a different altitudemight not be desirablebecauseof known
turbulenceor icing conditionsat the new altitude. Turning might take the aircraft into
restrictedSpecialUseAirspace(SUA), into a regionwith very congestedtraffic so that
FreeFlight is severelylimited, or into a differentATC sectorwherethe aircraftwould be
takeninto a lessdesirableTRACON feederfix leadingto a lessdesirablerunway. Each
aircraftconflict detectionand resolutionsystem/pilotwould needto have veto power in
orderto self limit suchmaneuveroptions.
The final part of the maneuverimplementationlogic is the recovery maneuver,
directedatreturningtheaircraftbackto courseafterthePCAhasbeenpassed.Exactlywhat
thedesiredaircraftreturnmaneuverconsistsof dependson wheretheaircraftis relativeto
theoriginal destination.In somecases,thepreferencewill be to return,within sometime
periodor range,to theoriginal 3D flight planafterpassingthe PCA. In othercases,the
preferencewill beto createa newplanstartingfrom thePCAandproceedingdirectlyto the
intendeddestination.Bothoptionswill havetheir utility, soboth shouldbe allowedfor in
themechanization.
6.4 Coordination and Communications Requirements
Good information is a pre-requisite for good decision making. The nature of coordinating
and communicating the information available for conflict detection and resolution affects
how, when, where, and what decisions are made. Important questions related to handling
and communication of data include:
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(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
(viii)
Types: What types of information need to be communicated between
conflict detection and resolution algorithms? This includes position,
velocity, aircraft identification, aircraft type, time, intent, destination, and
vehicle capabilities (equipage).
Accuracy: How accurate do these data need to be?
Transport: What is required to get the data to the appropriate place for
processing? What kinds of communications protocols are necessary? What
are the data latencies? How does data latency impact candidate solutions?
What nominal data update rates should be used?
Integrity: What precautions must be taken to assure data integrity (error
detection and correction, and/or forward error corrected communications)?
How does an implemented system check itself?. How does the system
respond to violations of data integrity? For example, depending upon back-
up modes of operation, GPS drop-outs can result in an increased position
and velocity uncertainty. How can GPS or other information drop-outs be
discerned, handled, and reported?
Completeness: Information about the local air traffic scenario may vary in
content and in regularity/availability due to equipage levels, ground support,
aircraft density, etc. What considerations arise as data content varies?
Adaptability: Technological advances are likely to improve the quantity and
quality of data available for conflict detection and resolution algorithms.
How should the algorithms and data structures be designed to allow for
future changes in the quantity and quality of data, enhancements to the
conflict detection and resolution logic, and evolution from non-equipped to
fully equipped fleets?
Coordination Method. What type of coordination is required for timing and
selection of conflict resolution maneuvers? Is a "Master/Slave" system
necessary, and will one on board computer determine the movement of both
aircraft or will the second aircraft solve for and/or negotiate its own action?
Data Flow within System Elements. Data flow and latency requirements
also exist between system elements. Data flow requirements are associated
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with sensor, alert, display, command/resolution,and pilot input data.
Delays are associatedwith data acquisition, communications,algorithm
processing,displayprocessing,andpilot interfacing. What aretheeffects
of thesedelayson conflict detectionandresolution,andwhat is neededto
ensurethatthesystemappropriatelyaccountsfor thesedelays?
Finally, the conflict detectionand resolution system imposes communications
requirements,not necessarilydedicatedsolely to solving conflict problems,but perhaps
contributingto anoverallcommunicationsnetwork. To addressimplementationissues,the
overall air-air and/or air-grounddataand voice communicationsneeds, including data
content, integrity, and data broadcastrate need to be understood and specified.
Furthermore,a mechanismfor handlinglost dataand addressingthe effectsof lost data
mustbe investigated.
6.5 Displays and Human Factors
The means of presenting conflict detection and resolution information to pilots and air
traffic controllers will play a crucial role in the effectiveness of an operational system.
Existing human-computer interfaces may become insufficient as Free Flight introduces
more complex conditions with potentially less-ordered traffic patterns than today. Today's
controller plan view displays use flat, 2D, monochrome displays with trackball inputs.
Cockpit traffic displays (e.g., TCAS II) have color 2D displays with knob controls. In the
future, highly interactive, real-time systems with 2D multi-layered moving map displays or
3D stereoscopic views from both the controller's as well as the pilot's perspective, color
and texture, touch-screen, and spatialized sound are possibilities.
Studies in display design indicate that there are tradeoffs and benefits to both 2D
and 3D displays for conflict detection and resolution and ATC/ATM. The study by
[SEL82] indicates that when a display does not show the third spatial dimension as readily
apparent as the other two, pilots tend to solve conflict avoidance problems in the displayed
two dimensions, rather than exploiting all three dimensions. For conflict resolution, this
implies that a 2D plan view display may bias conflict resolution solutions to heading
maneuvers even though the altitude maneuver might be a better choice. In a related study
[EMH87], pilots were more likely to chose a conflict resolution maneuver with a vertical
component when using a perspective display. Further studies by [HW93, Ma93, MCW95,
PG93, WTS89] explore 2D and 3D displays to aid specific ATC/ATM tasks.
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To illustratethepotentialof multi-modalhuman-computerinterfacesfor ATC/ATM
and Free Flight, [ADK96] investigateda virtual reality system. Conflict detectionand
resolutionadvisoriesweredisplayedin amulti-modalsystemengagingthevisual,auditory,
andvocalchannels.As shownin previouschapters,3Dperspectiveviewsof theProtected
AirspaceZone and TacticalAlert Zone can be overlayedaround an aircraft's current
positionor somefutureposition(usingintentdata). Usingthesezonesasalertingcues,an
air traffic controlleror pilot canpreviewconflict resolutionstrategiesprior to engagement,
and selectappropriateactions. Egocentricviews allow the user to travel along with a
particularaircraft; exocentricviews allow theuserto view the situationfrom any point in
this virtual space.Using multiple viewpoints, the air traffic controller or pilot can
thoroughlyinvestigateandacceptorrejectconflictresolutionadvisories,andcancoordinate
and/ornegotiateactionsbetweenaircraft. Guidancemaneuverscan be performedusing
tunnels-in-thesky (Figure96) or by following a traceof theconflict resolutiontrajectory
into thefuture(Figure97). Feedbackfrom pilots andair traffic controllersdifferedfor this
system. Pilots tendedto like how thevisualizationof futurepathshelpedthemto locate
neighboringaircraftandpreconditionthemfor conflict resolutionmaneuvers.Pilots also
like theegocentricviewpoint,sincetheytypically usedisplayscenteredaroundthe motion
of their own aircraft. Controllers,on the other hand, traditionallyhave fixed plan view
type displaysthathelpthemto estimateseparationdistances.Moving aroundin a virtual
spacepresentedin a perspectiveview createdproblemswith judging distancesand
performingtheir analysis.
Figure96. A 3D perspectwedisplayshowing tunnels-in-the-skyfor intent data
(takenfrom [ADK96] with permissionfrom theauthors).
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Figure97. A 3Dperspectivedisplayshowingintentdatafrom trajectoryprediction
results(takenfrom [ADK96] with permissionfrom theauthors).
Furtherresearchis necessaryto evaluatethehumanfactorsissuesfor both 2D and
3D typesof displays and the processof performingconflict detectionand resolution.
Importantissuesincludedeterminingthetimesrequiredto: previewandnegotiatea conflict
resolutionadvisorywith anotheraircraft,activatethemaneuverguidancelogic to performa
maneuver,and alert controllersand AOC dispatchers(if desired)to inform themof the
situation. Other issues include:display symbologyeffectiveness,passengercomfort,
information requirementsfor pilot and/or air traffic controller situationawareness,and
workloadanalysis.Towardsthisend,anoverviewof suchhumanfactorsissuesrelatedto
human-centeredaviationautomationis presentedin [Bi96].
6.6 Real-Time Testing
Both real-timecockpit simulatorandflight testswill play an importantrole in the system
mechanizationby providingreal-worldcalibrationandfeedbackaboutconflict detectionand
resolutionalgorithmsand interfaces.Real-timecockpit simulationwould be done using
piloted cockpit simulatorswith possibly inclusion of the air traffic manager/controller
and/orthe AOC dispatcherat appropriateworkstations. Flight testswould be donewith
one or more aircraftcollectingreal datafor conflict detectionand resolution. Required
technologies include processors, displays, GPS receivers, and digital radio
communicationsequipment. Thesehardwaretechnologies,in tandemwith the software
algorithmsthat drive them, promiseto be centralelementsof the operationalconflict
detectionandresolutionfunctionalityenvisionedfor FreeFlight. Early mannedsimulation
of aconflictdetectionandresolutionsystemwill helprevealreal-worldconsiderationsearly
in the process,provide for human-factorsexperimentationand feedback,and allow for
rapidlyprototypingof suchasystem.While analysesof algorithms,fast-timeMonte-Carlo
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simulations,andreal-timecockpitsimulationsarevaluabletoolsfor understandingmanyof
the issuesassociatedwith complexmatterslike real-timeconflict detectionandresolution,
theyremainonly approximationsof theactualflight environment. Thus, flight testingwill
alsobeneededto revealthefinal operationalconsiderations.
Amongthemattersthatshouldbeinvestigatedin real-timesimulationandflight testingare:
(i) Latencies: What latencies exist in the various elements of the system,
including displays, GPS, communications equipment, processed
information, pilot reactions, etc.? What are the properties of these latencies?
How do they affect system performance?
(ii) lntegri_: Are there weak links in the proposed solutions? What are the
system's fault tolerance properties? Does the system degrade gracefully?
What communications integrity is sufficient?
(iii) Communications: Are the update rates set by simulation testing sufficient for
data/communications and displays, and under what circumstances? What
confirmations for actions are desired and when?
(iv) Pilot Interface: What are effective means to communicate conflicts and
resolutions to pilots? What symbologies and audibles are expected at what
times? How difficult are the alerts and displays to learn? Does the pilot
understand and/or believe the data being presented? How does the pilot
work when in an environment characterized by varied queues, disturbances,
and work loads? How quickly can pilots be expected to identify alerts
and/or address them?
There are several motivations and advantages of the real-time testing. First, a real-
time simulation of two or more interacting aircraft requires thoughtful development of the
conflict detection and resolution implementation logic to a form similar to what would be
mechanized in actual avionics. This process would begin with a high-level block diagram
such as shown in Figure 94 and proceed to add functional detail. Completing this process
insures that the conflict detection and resolution logic, software and hardware are realizable
for all points in the envelope of possible aircraft encounters; this modeling and code
development process insures technical feasibility of the design.
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A real-timesimulationis thetestbedin which the displays, avionicstechnology,
andother input/output devises for pilot (and controller and/or AOC dispatcher) interaction
with the conflict detection and resolution system can be investigated. Displays cannot be
developed fully without testing them in a dynamic environment with the humans who will
be using them in the loop. Real-time testing is necessary to establish the timing
requirements of information exchange between aircraft-to-aircraft and aircraft-to-ground.
Real-time testing is also necessary to establish the procedures for pilots, controllers,
and AOC dispatchers in using a conflict detection and resolution system. This includes the
transition process of going from a complete air-to-air solution to an Alert Zone violation for
which ground-based ATM takes over. This testing is necessary to establish the operational
viability of the system.
Next, real-time simulation allows for an investigation into un-modeled error sources
that affect the dynamics of the encounter. As a simulation is run, the effects of these errors
can be directly measured with respect to performance metrics of the conflict detection and
resolution system. With repeated runs, stochastic distributions of miss distance, probability
of false alarm, etc. can be quantitatively evaluated.
Finally, real-time testing is useful for planning subsequent flight tests of the
system, since simulation testing is much less expensive than conducting flight tests and
field trials. Also, simulation testing allows the engineer to set the conditions and
environment of the flight test; in contrast, during field trials you literally take what you get.
Flight testing will clarify real-world considerations and address issues associated with the
actual flight condition mechanization. Flight test investigations can perform a real-world
check of the validity of assumptions and address the practicality of conflict definitions,
conflict determinations, and resolution algorithms.
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7. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this chapter, we summarize our research, state conclusions, and list recommendations
for future investigations.
7.1 Summary and Conclusions
For conflict detection, we performed both 2-dimensional and 3-dimensional analyses for
conflicts based on the penetration of the Protected Airspace Zone of one aircraft by a
second aircraft. Assuming that both aircraft hold constant velocities, analytic equations
were derived to identify the point-of-closest-approach and the time to the point-of-closest-
approach. Both deterministic (where trajectories are error free) and non-deterministic
analyses (where sensor, actuation, and wind perturbation errors may exist) were
performed.
In the deterministic analysis, several methods for detecting a tactical conflict were
compared. These methods include warnings prior to penetrating the Protected Airspace
Zone, generic TCAS logic, and methods based on the reachability space overlap of both
aircraft. The warning prior to penetrating the Protected Airspace Zone is tailored to and
most appropriate for Free Flight. The TCAS logic was shown to be ineffective at
guaranteeing that the Protected Airspace Zone will be avoided. Finally, the reachability
conflict detection mechanism is quite conservative, but may be applicable in multi-aircraft
short range tactical conflicts where the actions of another aircraft might be extreme.
In a non-deterministic analysis, we showed how a conflict probability map can be
constructed. Both a Monte Carlo technique and an analytic technique for constructing
conflict probability maps were investigated. The analytic technique has the advantage of
not requiring repeated simulations. We showed how this conflict probability map can form
the basis for a Strategic Alert Zone definition for long range strategic conflict detection.
An aircraft proximity management system was also described. A Delaunay
Triangulation formulation provides a mathematically precise representation for the trajectory
data management of all aircraft in a flight level. Such a system provides a means for
analyzing the neighbor relationships between aircraft and the nearby free space around air
traffic which can be utilized in multi-aircraft conflict detection and resolution. As
recommended in the next section, this Delaunay Triangulation formulation may be extended
to three dimensions.
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Conflict resolution maneuvers were investigated for the horizontal plane with either
heading or speed control, and in the vertical plane with altitude control. Optimal conflict
resolution maneuvers were developed for tactical close-range as well as strategic far-range
cases.
The tactical analysis optimizes safety by maximizing the distance at the point-of-
closest-approach. The tactical conflict resolution strategy was found to be the result of an
optimization problem: Determine the control as a function of the relative motion state such
that the range at closest approach is maximized. Solutions are obtained by applying Euler-
Lagrange equations for optimal control, and are best illustrated using maneuver charts.
Maneuver charts were generated for cooperative (both aircraft maneuver) and non-
cooperative cases (only one aircraft maneuvers) and for heading, speed, and altitude control
cases. These maneuver charts concisely illustrate the tactical collision avoidance "rules-of-
the-road" indicating the turn directions, acceleration signs, or climb/descent rates that each
aircraft should select for any arbitrary initial relative state of conflict. Additionally, the
maneuver charts identify a Tactical Alert Zone, the locus of points for which a maneuver
must be started in order to avoid penetrating the Protected Airspace Zone of another
aircraft.
The strategic analysis optimizes the economical cost of the maneuver while
maintaining safety as the constraint. The strategic conflict resolution strategy analyzes the
geometry of heading, speed, and altitude maneuvers that safely avoid the Protected
Airspace Zone, and estimates the Direct Operating Cost DOC (fuel and time costs) for these
maneuvers. Maneuvers can be chosen to minimize the total DOC for all aircraft involved or
to minimize the individual DOC of each aircraft; these conditions will not necessarily result
in the same maneuver. In general, altitude maneuvers are the most economical, followed by
heading maneuvers, and finally speed change maneuvers. For non-cooperative heading
maneuvers where only one aircraft maneuvers, it is generally more economical to turn the
aircraft to the backside of the non-cooperating aircraft. For cooperative cases where both
aircraft maneuver, it is generally better to let the faster aircraft bear more of the burden for
the strategic maneuver. The cost and range required for speed control maneuvers usually
make this an ineffective means of conflict resolution.
An economics analysis was also performed to investigate the benefit from a
reduction of horizontal separation standards. The cost of heading and speed maneuvers can
be reduced 3-fold for reducing the separation standard from 5 to 3 nmi. Reducing the
horizontal separation standard from 5 to 1 nmi reduces the cost of a maneuver by roughly
10 times. No significant change occurs in the cost of altitude maneuvers due to reducing
131
thehoizontalseparationstandard;theyare relatively inexpensivefor all cases. With the
reductionof separationstandards,it is importantto notethatthe effectsof wake vortices
behindaircraftmaybecomethelimiting factor.
Finally, the mechanizationof a conflict detectionand resolution system was
analyzed.We proposedthenecessarycomponentsfor a conflict detectionand resolution
systemanddiscussedeachcomponentandtheir interconnectivity.The systemsourcesof
error and uncertaintieswere identified, includingmeasurementand trajectoryprediction
uncertainty, actuation uncertainties, flight technical errors, and wind uncertainty.
Performancemetricswereidentifiedfor thepurposeof evaluatingthesafety,reliability, and
efficiency of the system. Thesemetrics include parametersfor collision, near miss,
acceptablemiss,andexcessivemissdistances.Suitablevaluesfor theseparametershould
be determinedin future research. The needfor an analysisof the probability of false
alarms, missed alarms, and incorrect maneuverswas also discussed;theseare also
mentionedin ourlist of recommendations.
Coordinationand communicationrequirements,humanfactors issues,displays,
andsimulationtestingwerealsodiscussed.A "Master/Slave"type logic was considered
for coordination,andfor coordinationoptions,wediscussedanalgorithmicimplementation
incorporatingcontingencyplans. Contingencyplans may be necessaryfor deadlock
conditions,avoidingthirdaircraftconflicts,or avoidingairspaceconstraints.The needfor
pilot, ATM, and AOC dispatcherdisplaysand humanfactors researchwas also briefly
discussed.Suggestionsfor displaysandhumanfactorsresearcharegiven in the list of
recommendations.Finally, thereis a needfor real-timetestingthrough simulationsand
actualflights to providereal-worldcalibrationanddesignfeedbackfor theconflict detection
andresolutionalgorithms,interfaces,relatedtechnologies,andoperatingprocedures.
7.2 Recommendations
The following recommendations are identified for further research into the problem of
conflict detection and resolution for Free Flight. These recommendations generally fall into
three categories: analysis, simulation, and mechanization.
Analysis:
7.2.1 Conflict Detection. For conflict detection, we performed both 2D and 3D
analyses based on the assumption that both aircraft hold constant velocities.
Further analysis should be performed to extend this analysis to consider either
aircraft having 1)a constant turn rate, 2)a constant acceleration vector, or
3) intent data (e.g., imbedded in an ADS-B message) indicating a future
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heading, speed,or altitudechange. Furthermore,analysisis necessaryto
assesseffectsof statemeasurementuncertainty,trajectorypredictionerrors,and
wind field perturbationson far rangestrategicconflict detection. Wind data
providedby real-timemeasurementsonboardaircraftthathavepreviouslyflown
through the airspaceneara conflict may be used to model the wind. The
applicationof fuzzylogicmaybeusefulin dealingwith thetrade-offthatexists
betweenusingearlymaneuversversusprocessingmoredatato betterassessthe
expectedprobabilityof anactualconflict.
7.2.2 Error Sensitivity Analysis. The conflict probability maps derived in
Chapter 3 propagate position and velocity uncertainty errors, but further error
analysis is necessary for conflict detection. The additional errors which are not
considered include horizontal wind gradients (the wind field in front of the own
aircraft may be different from that of an intruder aircraft), flight technical errors
(pilot control errors), and guidance errors. The last involves the errors the
system makes in computing an optimum resolution flight profile based on
uncertainties in measured aircraft states.
7.2.3 Altitude Maneuver Analysis. Altitude maneuvers were shown to be more
economical compared to heading and speed maneuvers. Consequently, future
air traffic control and air traffic management may involve a far greater
percentage of altitude maneuvers compared to today's fixed route, fixed flight
level system. A further, more detailed investigation should be performed to
look at the feasibility of multiple aircraft performing altitude maneuvers in Free
Flight. Altitude constraints for terrain, turbulence, and weather should be
included in the analysis.
7.2.4 Constrained Conflict Resolution. In this report, 2-aircraft encounters
were investigated without any constraints due to sector boundaries, restricted
airspace zones, weather, neighboring traffic, or terrain. For instance, the type
of conflict resolution strategy could be influenced by where the aircraft are
located relative to sector boundaries. These types of constraints on conflicts
should be included into the conflict resolution analysis in further research.
7.2.5 Rules-of-the-Road. The notion of a combined maneuver chart was
introduced in this report to combine the analysis of probability of missed and
false alarms with strategic and tactical conflict resolution strategies. Further
research should be performed to determined the best partitioning of this
combined maneuver chart and a mechanism for coordination of aircraft
maneuvers (e.g., the "Master/Slave" method). In addition, an analysis should
be performed to define the near miss, acceptable miss, and excessive miss
distances, as discussed in Chapter 6, based on following the "rules-of-the-
road".
7.2.6 Multi.Aircraft Conflicts and the Domino Effect. In this report, 2-
aircraft encounters were investigated for tactical and strategic conflicts.
Encounters which include three or more aircraft should be investigated in the
same detail. Such an investigation would extend the results derived for the 2-
aircraft scenarios. Also, the domino effect needs to be investigated. The
domino effect occurs when a conflict resolution maneuver for two aircraft
propagates into a conflict with a third (or more) aircraft. The Delaunay
Triangulation of all aircraft provides nearest neighbor information that might be
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combinedwith conflict resolutionanalysisto investigatethe dominoeffect. A
mathematicalcriterionshouldbeestablishedto identify when thedominoeffect
will happen.
7.2.7 Proximity Management. The Delaunay Triangulation of all aircraft in a
flight level is a computationally efficient mechanism to maintain proximity
information. A comparison should be made between a method using layers of
2D Delaunay Triangulations, a method using a full 3D Delaunay Triangulation,
and a method of using grid-based sorting of aircraft for the purpose of
proximity management. Experiments should be performed to investigate the
utility of these techniques for providing ATM with a robust and distributed
system for monitoring and tracking all aircraft, for AOC dispatchers with
proximity management of their fleets, and for aircraft with proximity
management of nearby traffic.
Simulation:
7.2.8 Detailed System Modeling. A high fidelity simulation capability can be
developed by expanding the system block diagram components in Figure 94
into functional details of environmental models, aircraft dynamics,
communications elements, sensors, algorithms, and displays. Mathematical
models need to be developed for each system component with realistic error
characteristics, parameter options, and environmental disturbances. Encounters
between aircraft with different equipage and in well modeled environmental
conditions should be investigated with this type of high fidelity simulation
capability.
7.2.9 Fast Time Simulations. Fast time algorithm simulations are needed to
provide Monte Carlo results investigating: effects of errors on the statistics for
final miss distance, false, and missed alarms; sensitivity of performance to the
variations of system parameters; and performance of the "rules-of-the-road" and
trigger mechanisms for conflict detection.
7.2.10 Manned Simulations. Manned simulations are needed to provide the real-
world calibration and human factors feedback about a conflict detection and
resolution system under Free Flight scenarios. Issues to be investigated with
such a simulation capability include system latencies, communications,
interfaces, and system effectiveness. These simulations and the preparations of
the algorithms and hardware components for these simulations will help setup
follow-on flight tests.
Mechanization:
7.2.11 Displays. Candidate displays should be developed for conflict detection and
resolution for not only the pilot, but for ATM as well as AOC dispatchers. This
work should be performed with NASA human factors experts providing
guidance in a human-centered design approach [Bi96]. 3D perspective, 2D plan
view, and 2D profile view displays should be compared.
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7.2.12 Communications Coordination. Cooperative conflict resolution strategies
require good communications/coordination between the two aircraft involved.
Further investigations should be performed to identify the complexities of hand
shaking, "Master/Slave" coordination, time delays, data dropouts, and update
rates. This analysis should include manned simulations to evaluate the best
parameter selections.
7.2.13 Transfer of Control to Ground.Based A TM. An investigation into the
transfer of control from an air-to-air flight-deck-based solution for the conflict
resolution problem to a ground-based ATM positive control solution is needed.
This research will affect parameters chosen for Alert Zone sizing and conflict
detection. This research will also need to investigate the relationship between
dynamic density in Free Flight and the transition to ground-based control.
7.2.14 Multi.Modal Visualization. Several 3D perspective views of the conflict
detection and resolution scenarios were presented in this report based on an
investigation performed by [ADK96]. This visualization may be extended to
include combined Protected Airspace Zone, Alert Zone, intent, traffic, weather,
terrain, wake vortex, and wind field information. Also, this visualization
should be expanded to include multi-modal human-computer interaction
techniques, that is, voice commands, audible warnings, 3D spatialized sound,
data gloves inputs, etc. (see [ADK96]). Human factors issues related to such
human-computer interaction techniques should be investigated to identify the
utility of presenting information this way to either a pilot, air traffic manager, or
AOC dispatcher. This may require further development of multi-modal
visualization environments specifically designed for the pilot, air traffic
manager, or AOC dispatcher.
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